

published monthly since 1866

The Fortnightly

FOUNDED IN 1865 BY ANTHONY TROLLOPE

SEPTEMBER, 1947

CMLXIX N.5

CONTENTS

THE MORAL FOUNDATION OF DEMOCRACY	J. MIDDLETON MURRY
THE CRISIS BEHIND THE CRISIS	WILLIAM RYDAL
MR. AMERY'S THOUGHTS ON THE CONSTITUTION	SIR ERNEST BARKER
INTER-ASIAN RELATIONS	IQBAL SINGH
PAIN REVISITED (II)	A. F. WILLS
FORM CENTRES :	
GREECE	GEORGE PENDLE
INDONESIA	H. H. B. MOSBERG
THE TREATMENT OF THE P.O.W.	T. C. SKEFFINGTON-LODGE, M.P.
ANTARCTICA	FRANK ILLINGWORTH
CRUSADER—A Poem	JAMES MONAHAN
THE NATURE OF POETRY	RICHARD CHURCH
INSTRUCTION FOR FARMERS	S. L. BENSUSAN
Correspondence—"Russia and the Middle East" and "Three Views on the Marshall Offer".	

PRICE 3s. 6d. or 75 CENTS

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

42s. or \$8.50 PER ANNUM

ALL CLASSES
OF INSURANCE •
TRANSACTION

MOTOR UNION
INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED
10, ST. JAMES'S STREET, LONDON, S.W.1.

WHERE TO STAY

WELLINGTON HOTEL

TUNBRIDGE WELLS.

Delightfully situated at the summit of the Common facing South. Private suites at moderate terms. Lock-up Garage. Passenger Lift. First-class management.

Hot and cold water and gas fires in bedrooms.

UNSURPASSED FOR SITUATION AND SERVICE.

Telephone: 1150. Proprietors: Trust Houses Ltd.

THE NORFOLK

Brighton's Premier Hotel - Facing the Sea

DINNER & DANCING EVERY EVENING TO
JEFFREY ESSEX & HIS ORCHESTRA

SPECIAL TERMS QUOTED ON APPLICATION MANAGER
MOVE 8201 GARAGE

PULBOROUGH, SUSSEX

CHEQUERS

Unusual comfort, Old-world charm. Delightful sunny location. C.H., log fires, etc. - really warm in Winter. Farm and garden produce, varied and appetising meals (invariably commended). Excellent golf, riding, fishing; lovely walks. 1 hr. London; near station. Licensed.

TEL: PULBOROUGH 86.

BUDOCK VEAN

FOR BLUE SKIES, BLUE WATERS, PEACE,
RELAXATION, GOLF, FISHING, SAILING,
AND LOVELY SANDY COVES

MANOR HOUSE HOTEL

BUDOCK VEAN, NR. FALMOUTH, S.W. CORNWALL

LLANGOLLEN. Hand Hotel. One of the best in N. Wales. H. & C. water all rooms. Facing River Dee, free fishing (trout). A.A. & R.A.C. Tel. 3207.

DELICIOUS VINTAGE

CIDER AND PERRY

SUPPLIED IN RETURNABLE 6, 10 & 15 GALLON CASKS
IMMEDIATE DELIVERY WHILE STOCKS LAST

WRITE FOR PRICE LIST

The Cotswold Cider Company

NEWENT, GLOUCESTERSHIRE

THE FOOD SITUATION

The interesting Correspondence Course in Food Values will show you how to make the most of your rations.

Write for Particulars—

F.D.T., THE CATERING CORRESPONDENCE COLLEGE, LTD

34 - 37, AYBROOK STREET, LONDON, W.1.

FAMOUS MEN PLEAD HUMANITY'S CAUSE




Photo: Walter Stoneman, London

MR. WINSTON CHURCHILL

writes:

"The Royal Cancer Hospital is doing work of which the Nation should be proud. It is fighting this fell disease—trying to establish its cause and discover a cure—providing beds for patients and keeping those who are inoperable free from pain. If those who have contemplated, even for an instant, the possibility of being one day themselves in the clutch of cancer, subscribe to the fund, the present difficulty of raising sufficient money to continue the work, should be easily overcome."

Please send a Gift to the Treasurer

The Royal Cancer Hospital

(FREE)

FULHAM ROAD LONDON, S.W.3

THE FORTNIGHTLY

Published Monthly by The Fortnightly Review, Ltd., at 4, 5 & 6, Soho Sq., London, W.1

SEPTEMBER, 1947

CONTENTS

	PAGE
THE MORAL FOUNDATION OF DEMOCRACY. BY J. MIDDLETON MURRY ...	161
THE CRISIS BEHIND THE CRISIS. BY WILLIAM RYDAL ...	170
MR. AMERY'S THOUGHTS ON THE CONSTITUTION. BY SIR ERNEST BARKER ...	177
INTER-ASIAN RELATIONS. BY IQBAL SINGH ...	184
SPAIN REVISITED (II). BY A. F. WILLS ...	191
STORM CENTRES :	
GREECE. BY GEORGE PENDLE ...	198
INDONESIA. BY H. H. B. MOSBERG ...	200



September

September is the month when schools reopen. Entering a new school, moving into a fresh form, embarking upon a different course of studies—these are important occasions in the lives of young people. To those who have them in their charge, provision for

the future is an ever present obligation, and it is good sense to ensure that plans for the coming generation will be faithfully observed. In particular you must be able to rely on the availability of your trustees just at the moment when your children have need of them. The Manager of any branch of the Midland Bank will readily explain the services of the Bank's Executor and Trustee Company, where friendly personal assistance, based on wide experience, is always at your disposal in matters concerned with wills, trusts (educational or other) and settlements.

MIDLAND BANK EXECUTOR AND TRUSTEE COMPANY LIMITED

CONTENTS.—contd.

	PAGE
THE TREATMENT OF THE P.O.W. BY T. C. SKEFFINGTON-LODGE, M.P. ...	204
ANTARCTICA. BY FRANK ILLINGWORTH	207
CRUSADER— <i>A Poem.</i> BY JAMES MONAHAN	212
THE NATURE OF POETRY. BY RICHARD CHURCH	215
RUSSIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST— <i>Correspondence.</i> V. STAMBULOV	221
THREE VIEWS ON THE MARSHALL OFFER— <i>Correspondence.</i> TIBOR MENDE ...	224

THE FORTNIGHTLY LIBRARY :

INSTRUCTION FOR FARMERS. BY S. L. BENSUSAN 225

Other Contributors: *H. G. Nicholas, R. P. Schwarz, Tibor Mende, The Hon. Nigel Bruce, C. Northcote Parkinson, James Bartlett, W. Thomson Hill, Eric Gillett, J. A. Waley Cohen, Norman Nicholson, Grace Banyard.*

¶ While the Editor is glad to consider articles offered for publication, he cannot undertake to return MSS. unless accompanied by a stamped envelope.

¶ The Editorial, Advertising and General Business Offices of THE FORTNIGHTLY are at 4, 5 & 6, Soho Square, London, W.1.

¶ Entered as second-class matter, January 4, 1934, at the Post Office at New York, N.Y., under the Act of March 3, 1897 (Sec. 397 P.L. & R.).

¶ Registered for transmission by Canadian Magazine Post.



This world-famed Sherry (formerly called Findlater's Fino) could not be registered under that name and thereby protected from imitators. For the safeguarding therefore of our world-wide clientele we have renamed it—Findlater's Dry Fly Sherry.

FINDLATER MACKIE TODD & CO. LTD.

Wine & Spirit Merchants to H.M. the King.

THE FORTNIGHTLY

SEPTEMBER, 1947

THE MORAL FOUNDATION OF DEMOCRACY

J. MIDDLETON MURRY

DAY by day more and more people are becoming aware that in this country we are in the throes of a crisis of morality. The exhortations that men should do their duty by their country in the circumstances of peace, less dramatic but more exacting than those of war, seem to fall on deaf ears. The very conception of duty, as applied to the common round, the daily task, appears to have become faint and remote and old-fashioned. It would be counted tactless in the extreme, or a monstrous solecism, if the coal-miners and the building operatives who go slow, were roundly declared to be traitors to their country. And, in fact, though there is plenty of justification for thus denouncing them, the conception of the commonweal implied in such a denunciation has never been really operative in this country. The workers are merely behaving as the employers behaved before them. No large body of opinion has ever regarded it as a scandal to the commonwealth that employers in a given industry should combine to protect the least efficient from bankruptcy by raising their prices against the consumer; they were never denounced as traitors to their country. To denounce the workers as traitors when they employ the same methods for their protection would be a manifest injustice.

That is perfectly true. But the fact remains that, in both cases, the commonwealth was, and is, being betrayed, by what is reckoned to be normal behaviour on both sides. The root of the trouble is that during a long period of abnormal national prosperity, based on our virtual monopoly of the techniques and resources of industrialism, we were able at once to indulge our individualism, and to increase the national wealth. It was a period of profound moral confusion, in which social duty and personal inclination seemed to be identical and were for the most part represented, even by the philosophers, to be identical. The citizen, in order to be a good citizen, had only to strive to become legitimately rich; and society, in order to be a good society, had only to impose the minimum of limitations on that effort. That was freedom. Since this conception of freedom also included freedom of speech, and ultimately political equality, it had its points. It was sustained by the buoyancy of an invincible but short-sighted optimism which inspired men with the belief that the more freedom, the more progress—freedom being considered as the absence of external restraints.

Quite suddenly—in relation to the tempo of history to which we are accustomed—this blessed period has ended. But the habits of thought and behaviour

which it created persist, as do the political institutions which those habits fashioned for themselves. These political institutions worked because the harmony of interests which they presupposed did, in fact, exist, and because the values esteemed by either side of the apparent political antithesis were roughly the same. They are, in themselves, wholly admirable political institutions, of which other nations are understandably envious. The outer world will have still greater cause to envy them, if they can successfully stand the strain of the years which lie immediately ahead.

That is the question. We need to realize that these political institutions of ours—in spite of their familiarity—are really in advance of our own moral achievement. They were developed in a period when it was, so to speak, easy to be good. Now they have to stand the strain of a period when goodness is going to be difficult. Henceforward, for the citizens of democratic Britain, duty and inclination will pull in very different directions; and if inclination has the victory, as it is having to-day, there will be a quick decline into catastrophe.

The moral issue may be translated into explicit political terms in either of two ways. If the present Government is defeated at a general election, it will be largely due to the resentment felt by the majority of the public at the lack of industrial discipline which has diminished real productivity. In that case the moral issue will present itself as the question whether a government elected to impose discipline on the workers will be obeyed by the workers. Or it may arise while the present Government is still in office. It may be compelled, however reluctantly, itself to attempt to enforce industrial discipline. Will the workers obey it? No one who forms a dispassionate judgment of social morale in Britain at the present would reply to either question with a confident "Yes". Yet, if the workers were, in either case, to refuse to obey the Government, our democratic polity would be on the point of shipwreck.

Those who maintain that the present Government has done wisely in refusing to force the issue and postponing it as long as it can, have this strong argument on their side: that you cannot force workers to work in a democracy. It may be true; but it is a double-edged truth. As a maxim of government in democracy, if it means more than that you cannot force workers to work at the point of the bayonet, it is pernicious. If it means that a democratic society is compelled to maintain its workers, whether they work well or badly, democracy is doomed to moral and economic disaster. Ultimately, under democracy, the Government must be granted by general consent the power to use compulsion, in the most expedient forms, to compel its citizens to work. If a Labour government were to exercise this power upon the industrial workers, and they were to disobey, they would be plainly refusing to obey the orders of their own chosen political representatives. The anarchy would be obvious; but it would be equally anarchical if they were to refuse to obey the orders of a government democratically elected in opposition to Labour.

Democracy does indeed depend upon consent: but the consent upon which it depends is not the positive consent of all citizens, and all bodies of citizens, to every piece of legislation which it enacts. The consent on which it depends is the consent to the working of democracy. In other words, it is of the essence of the democratic "contract" that its citizens agree in advance to be bound by the decisions of the sovereign parliament, however much those decisions may be contrary to their own inclination. The condition on which they enter into this agreement is that they are entirely free, by choosing another parliament, and another government, to revoke or amend those decisions; but until the decisions are thus revoked or amended, the citizens of democracy undertake to obey them.

This tacit agreement is the moral "contract" on which democracy is based. Once it is broken by any considerable number of citizens—too numerous to be peremptorily coerced—the dissolution of the democratic society has begun. That, as far as one can tell, is the condition of France at the present time, where the peasants on the one hand, even more than the industrial workers on the other, are flouting the laws of the Republic with regard to the delivery of grain, in addition to having extorted a fantastically privileged position in respect of taxation.* The democracy of Britain is not so far advanced in decay. But it would be folly to pretend that she is not on the slippery slope. The overt political challenge to democracy has been so far avoided, because the Government has confined itself to exhortation of the workers. That wise restraint, or unwise weakness—it is too early to pronounce which it is—has been made possible by the large-scale charity of U.S.A., which is now nearly exhausted. When it comes to an end, the citizens of Britain will be faced with the straight question whether, in order to maintain their present standard of life, they are prepared to do more work for the same wages. If any large section of them refuses, political deadlock and economic paralysis will follow.

There is an economic duty for every citizen to do to-day, to work harder and more conscientiously for the reward he is now getting. But the idea of an economic duty to the commonweal is really, in spite of all the propaganda, uncongenial and unfamiliar to British citizens. Their economic duty, they have become habituated to feel, is primarily to themselves. With their political duty in the narrower and negative sense they are more familiar. There is at present no real support in the country for any movement which aims at the political overthrow of democracy by the violent seizure of power. But the idea of positive political duty is really no more familiar, and perhaps no more congenial, than that of positive economic duty. Such positive duty would consist, for example, in encouraging the Government to exact a standard of efficient work, or to stabilize wages on a basis of all-round justice. Unless it is remedied, this failure to accept positive duties, whether in their economic or

* See R. P. Schwarz: *The Monnet Plan and its Chances*, in THE FORTNIGHTLY, July 1947.

their complementary political aspects, will necessarily destroy even the negative sense of political duty. If the peaceful procedures of democracy have for their result the widespread evasion of social duty—if, in other words, the freedom that democracy cherishes in fact is merely the freedom to be socially irresponsible—then the only alternative to sheer anarchy is authoritarianism.

There are two main points at which the moral basis, or presupposition, of democracy becomes plainly evident. The first is the fundamental political freedom whereby the political minority at any given moment is free to criticize the existing government and organize an alternative to it. This is the necessary guarantee of real political equality. That this is rather lightly esteemed by the present Government is shown by its imposition of a cut in newsprint, as though newsprint in a democracy were on a level with other imported commodities. That is a dangerous fallacy. The material necessary for the communication of information and expression of criticism should, in a democracy, have an *absolute* priority over all other necessities. Though we do not, for a moment, suppose that the mis-estimation of the newspaper press by the Government is reasoned and deliberate, the fact that it can inflict such a vital deprivation upon the country, as it were, automatically is ominous. It indicates the advance of totalitarianism in the unconsciousness.

If we ask ourselves *why* the citizens of democracy should be passionately concerned to keep political freedom undiminished, there is ultimately no answer except that we recognize it as the moral law that every citizen of the democratic society should be secured the maximum of freedom compatible with the ordered existence of society as a whole: that is, compatible with the maximum of freedom for others. Freedom is thus seen to be immediately dependent on duty—the duty of maintaining freedom for others. It consists not merely in a willingness to obey the law, but in the acceptance of a very definite conception of what the law is—it is the legislation necessary to maximize freedom within a cohesive society.

This is all fairly familiar in terms of purely political philosophy, owing to that peculiarity of British history whereby we are enabled to advance in the political field while letting the economic take care of itself. The dissociation was deceptive. For the technical progress which it has accelerated has had for its consequence an almost entire inter-penetration of the political and the economic, which sets before us the old, indeed the eternal and essential political problem, in an unfamiliar guise.

It was easy enough to work out a practical conception of political freedom when the economic side of the nation's activity could be left to itself. But two new factors have completely changed this comfortable situation. The first is beneficent: the emergence and general acceptance of a new conception of social justice, which insists that the citizens of democracy has the right to be economically secure, and that it is a remediable wrong that unemployment and poverty should be forced upon him. The second is not so good. It is the almost entire

destruction of Britain's position of economic privilege, relatively to the rest of the world, by the effect of two world-wars, and the development of other centres of industrialism. The victory of the new conception of social justice thus synchronizes, and is indeed causally connected, with an enormous diminution of the material resources with which to implement it.

It follows that, if the new conception of social justice is to be implemented, it can only be by the universal adoption of a new social morality. The margin which might have enabled the demands of social justice to be temporarily met without a revolution of our social morality does not exist.

The first question to ask is whether the new demands of social justice are, in themselves, just: that is, in accord with the peculiar and very definite conception of democratic justice, whereby that is just which tends to the maximization of freedom, provided that it is compatible with the continued existence of ordered society. I do not think any reasonable person can deny that the new demand for social justice is itself just. It arises, logically and inevitably, from the previous demand for political equality, which has been generally accepted by the free society of Britain as just. The establishment of political equality (which depends on the maintenance of political freedom) has produced, quite inevitably, a demand for the establishment not of economic equality, but of economic justice. It has produced that demand, in the sense that it has enabled it to become not merely vocal, but a definite directive to the government of the country. In other words, Britain, functioning as a society of political equality, is determined to establish social justice. Or is it merely that she has the desire to do so? There is a difference.

How can that determination be carried through, or that desire satisfied? Obviously it cannot be carried through at all, unless it is accompanied by an equal determination to maintain society in existence. If society is to guarantee economic security to its citizens, its citizens must guarantee their work to society: and if they will not do this voluntarily, they must be compelled to do so, if society is to survive. The basic principle is perfectly plain. Unfortunately, its operation can be postponed, by living "on tick" so long as tick is available; or obscured by the current confusion between an increase in money wages and an increase in real income; or ignored because there exists no norm of the amount of work required to justify the worker's security or his claim upon society. What is certain is that at the present time the inhabitants of Britain are consuming much more than they produce, and that it is charity which enables them to do this.

When the charity comes to an end, Britain's consumption will have to be limited to what she produces. If the present standard of living of its citizens is to be maintained, it can only be done by increasing production without increasing the money-claims upon it. That is to say, people will have to do more work for the same wages. The only alternative is to let the standard of living decline.

But it is very difficult indeed in a democracy in which the working-class is in political control to persuade people to accept either a reduction in their standard of living, or the duty of working harder for the same wages. Although it is true that, if they do not work harder, a reduction in the standard of living will be imposed on them, simply because the goods will not exist for them to buy with their money, the probable reaction will be not to work harder to produce more goods, but to demand higher wages to meet the rising prices of the scarcer goods, the only result of which will be that prices will rise still more. There are two main causes of this inadequate and indeed infantile reaction. One is the lamentable lack of understanding of the true economic situation: which we may call lack of education. The other is the working-man's simple feeling that it is unjust to require him to work harder while so many members of the same society live in conditions of obvious luxury. Some of these work hard, no doubt; but others no not. And perhaps the most obnoxious of all are the many new rich whose overwhelming motor-cars are manifestly the reward for operations on the black-market. Education into the realities of the economic situation cannot diminish the feeling of resentment at economic inequality of this kind.

At this point we are plunged in a chaos of moral confusion. For the working-class is not enamoured of economic equality. As between themselves the workers in various industries actively resist any suggestion that wages should be equalized. They cling stubbornly to the idea that an engineer should be paid more than a carpenter, and a coal-miner more than an agricultural labourer; and they are just as eager as ever that their children should escape from industrial occupations altogether. It seems that their idea of social justice is entirely vague and incoherent; as incoherent perhaps as is the Labour Government's idea of Socialism, which permits it to create a new galaxy of prodigiously remunerated posts on this or that new board of control.

In normal circumstances one could trust to the mere operation of political democracy eventually to produce some order out of this moral chaos, and to achieve, by trial and error, some concrete pattern of social justice which was generally admitted to be just. But the circumstances are not normal. We cannot take the continued existence of the democratic society for granted. The urgent problem is to secure its economic foundations. And those, it seems, cannot be secured unless there exists in the general mind a pattern of a just society which can command their enthusiasm. At present there is no such pattern. Such enthusiasm as there is among the politically-minded working-class for a new pattern of society is for the pattern of Soviet Russia. Naturally, it commends itself only to a tiny, though fanatical, minority, because it is demonstrably a society in which the foundation of social justice in British eyes—namely, political equality—has been ruthlessly destroyed. Unfortunately, the Labour Party during its propaganda period, made no serious attempt to construct a pattern of democratic Socialism which would be viable in itself and

could be understood by the working-class. The blessed word "nationalization" was made to serve instead; but, as the Labour Government itself now realizes, "nationalization" solves none of the economic problems of the nation. "Nationalization", as actually practised in Britain, creates no more industrial discipline, and produces no more goods than before: in fact, it has diminished both.

Nationalization is a valid social conception only if it is accompanied by a new sense of social responsibility among the workers in the industry nationalized. They have to realize that they have become the trustees, on behalf of the nation, for the industry. They are, in that capacity, entitled to demand security of employment, and decent conditions of work; but in return they must give the best work of which they are capable. Such a conception is fatally remote from the minds of the coal-miners. Apparently, their attitude is roughly this. They have a new boss, the State. Unlike the old boss, he has no real control over them. On the contrary, they—through the political power of their union—have a real control over him. Therefore they can extort from him wage-rates and conditions of work which are quite unjust to the community at large. That the State represents the community at large, and that they are under a moral obligation not to exploit the community which has placed them in a new position of security and privilege, apparently never enter their heads.

The only remedy for such a situation is education into the responsibilities of democratic citizenship. Catastrophe and privation is one means of education; but in the present condition of British democracy it is a most dangerous means. For economic catastrophe on the scale required may and probably will put an end to democracy itself. Education by exhortation, which is now being attempted, meets (as we have seen) with the grave obstacle that social justice is so very imperfect. Why should the miners work harder, when the black-market-boys and the spivs flaunt their ill-gotten gains? One may conclude that education by exhortation will continue to be fruitless as it has been until there is that overall direction of labour which the Trade Unions have hitherto resisted. The rudiments at least of a new social discipline must be imposed by the State, which represents the community as a whole, and at the present time, the working-class in particular. Whether our democracy can move forward from a rudimentary to a more refined discipline, depends on the widespread acceptance of the necessity of discipline. But a beginning must be made somewhere. It is fantastic that a social democracy should continue to tolerate the blatantly anti-social behaviour of the spivs and the absentees.

But even when these crying scandals have been suppressed, there is still a long way to go before the rough foundations of a new social morality have been laid. The time to do it is perilously short. And it is no use making scapegoats of the coal-miners, or the builders, or the dockers. It is true enough that if they were to redouble their efforts, democracy would be saved. But—they not unreasonably protest—why should they alone be called upon

to make the effort? A universal effort to work harder and more conscientiously is required, not merely from the manual workers, but from the vast army of state and local officials, from the employers, professional classes, and above all from every educative agency in the country. For the people of the country have to be indoctrinated with the idea of social democracy: of what a democracy of social justice requires of them.

When the nature of the problem is soberly considered, it is preposterous that the totalitarian societies, both Communist and Fascist, with their relatively simple task, devoted a large proportion of their energies to indoctrination; but British democracy does not. The reason probably is that democratic indoctrination is a far harder task. But it is just as necessary. To neglect it because it is far harder is to court disaster.

The difference between the two kinds of indoctrination is patent. The totalitarian society indoctrinates its subjects—they cannot justly be called citizens—with the idea that duty consists in obedience to an external command. If democracy were to do that it would destroy itself. Democracy has to indoctrinate its citizens with the idea that duty is self-imposed. Just as the democratic society freely chooses its government, so the democratic citizen must freely choose to do his duty to the commonweal. He puts his conscience in control of his actions. He obeys the law, not as an external command, but as the expression of his own better self, which wills to act in obedience to a law which its reason recognizes to be necessary. Democracy is, essentially, a form of society which embodies an act of faith in the fundamental good-will of man. It is based on the supposition that man is impelled, by a compulsion of his own nature, to obey the moral law.

Why is political equality a good thing, if not because it stands in the nature of man that he should be treated as an end and not as means? And why should we suppose that democracy, in which political equality is established, will produce good and not evil, unless because we believe in the essential goodness of the human will? These things we have taken for granted, in a period when, as we have said, it was easy to be good. Now they are to be put to the test. Democracy is based, not only in theory but in fact, upon the reality of a universal obligation to obey the moral law. If that obligation is not recognized, and acted on, democracy must, in time of real stress, collapse. If the validity of the moral law is an illusion, so is the validity of democracy.

And we must not shut our eyes to the fact that a process of undermining the conception of the validity of the moral law has been going on for years. As the authority of Christianity declined, mainly under the impact of the new claim to a society of justice in this world, so new theories of moral relativism spread among the intellectuals and the masses. The palpable identification of Christian morality with the maintenance of a society of privilege and possession gave this relativism its opportunity. There was, alas, only too much truth in the slogan that "religion was the opium of the people." Yet the idea that

morality was essentially autonomous and independent of religion was too difficult for men.

Nevertheless, on that idea democracy in fact depends. It is not that morality is antagonistic to religion, though it is antagonistic to many forms of religion, even of the Christian religion. But morality does not depend upon religion. Perhaps it would be truer to say that insight into the autonomy of morality is itself the basis of all religion that is good. Democracy is the form of society which consciously or unconsciously is based on the principle of the autonomy of morality. The paradox is that such a form of society has come into being by a gradual process of development, largely in ignorance of its own basic principle. The moment came—not many years ago—when the principle of political equality seemed self-evident at its own level. Men were not compelled to look for what lay beneath, because the economic society still functioned automatically. Political justice secured, economic justice could look after itself. We have learned, or are learning, that it cannot.

But we shall never solve this problem of combining economic justice with political justice without going deeper into the conception of morality. The plain facts are that political democracy in Europe has conspicuously failed to stand the strain of economic distress in the recent past, and that the political system which most plausibly offers economic justice does so by openly flouting political justice. The problem of reconciling political freedom with economic justice—which is the specific and urgent problem of democracy—has nowhere been finally solved. Perhaps it never will be solved finally. Anyhow, it is quite enough to strive for the greatest measure of economic justice that is, at any given time, compatible with the continued functioning of political democracy.

We are not facing the problem seriously enough; we are not yet sufficiently aware of the problem it conceals. It is the question whether men are really capable of obedience to the moral law. In the last resort the problem of human freedom must reduce to that. Obedience to the moral law is the condition of human freedom; and freedom cannot be rationally conceived save as obedience to the moral law. Kant rendered humanity the signal service of making this plain. Nothing could well be more timely than the publication of a whole-hearted vindication of Kant's doctrine of the Categorical Imperative.* In essentials, Kant's doctrine is impregnable, for it insists on the absolute interdependence of rationality and morality. That it is impregnable does not mean that it must prevail. A vast wave of irrationality is still sweeping over the world, and it can be stemmed only by the resolute exercise of man's moral will, which is also his will to be a rational being in a society of rational beings. On the exercise of that moral will the life of democracy depends. How many of its citizens are being educated into it to-day?

* *The Categorical Imperative: A Study in Kant's Moral Philosophy.* By H. L. Paton, Whyte's Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Oxford. Hutchinson. 21s.

THE CRISIS BEHIND THE CRISIS

BY WILLIAM RYDAL

A CAREFUL perusal of Hansard only confirms first impressions of the debate on "the state of the nation" as reported in the press. The Prime Minister's was a pedestrian performance, and his outline of the Government's proposals for meeting the crisis fully deserved the epithets of "hasty improvisation", "ill-considered and incomplete" applied to them by Mr. Eden. The Chancellor of the Exchequer amplified the information about the dollar drain, the immediate crisis of balance-of-payments, and trudged heavily again over the ground covered by Mr. Attlee without, however, giving any more positive indications how "the wide yawning gap between exports and imports" was to be bridged. Only Sir Stafford Cripps, of the Government spokesmen, came down to brass tacks by focusing attention on the fundamental economic setting of the present monetary stress—the crisis behind the crisis—and thereby cutting the ground from under the feet of yapping Conservative opponents. Mr. Churchill's taunt in his Woodstock speech at the week-end, that the Labour Government had frittered away the American loan, was as irresponsible as it was untrue, and the official spokesmen had no difficulty in disproving that charge. Enemy sharpshooters, like Mr. Quintin Hogg, and Mr. Nigel Birch, scored a number of bulls-eyes in indicting the Government for undue optimism and lack of foresight. But the Opposition as a whole showed itself once more bankrupt of any alternative policy. And so there is no question of a political crisis. But the light remains at red.

The case against the Government is not that it has brought about a serious deterioration of the nation's economic position by rash and foolhardy experiments in Socialist planning but that, having accepted the crippling conditions accompanying the American loan, it has failed to appreciate—or at any rate to convey to the nation—what that bondage entailed. With the shibboleths of economic orthodoxy all the time on their lips—multilateral trade and convertible currencies and so on—our leaders have consistently failed to face up to the grim facts of the "artificial" (the word is Mr. Attlee's) economic position in which this country finds itself—and has found itself for a matter of thirty years. They have attempted to do too much too quickly in the way of reconstruction, especially of capital equipment, as if the dollar loans constituted an Anderson shelter when, as we can see now, they could not be anything more than an umbrella at the mercy of the stormy winds of politics.

Sir John Anderson put his finger unerringly on the basic facts which are

simple enough. We are at present consuming as a community to the tune of some 450-750 millions a year more than we are producing: and that concerns our standard of life as a nation, it is not essentially a dollar problem. The Government, as he said, is not responsible for the general situation with which Great Britain was confronted after the war, neither is it responsible for the great inherent difficulty of expanding our exports, nor for the increased price of imports. But it *is* responsible for engendering "a wholly fictitious sense of well-being", for pretending that the country could afford all the desiderata and the improvements set forth in the Party programme. Each of these things may well have been desirable in itself—shorter hours, higher wages, family allowances, new school buildings, great schemes of colonial development and overdue operations for the re-equipment of our industries. But the aggregate, alongside necessary repairs of war damage and arrears of maintenance, has added up to the picture of a country living far beyond its means: hence the present flight from sterling which is the real meaning of the action of countries like Sweden and Argentina in restricting imports from us in order to turn their favourable balances with us into dollars.

A telling statement on the domestic aspect of the crisis was made by Mr. Roy Harrod, the economist (and Joint Editor of *The Economic Journal*), in an article in the *Daily Mail* on August 6. The object of the American and Canadian loans, he says, was to tide over the immediate post-war period during which the troops had to be brought home and our industrial equipment re-converted or repaired for the production of peace-time goods. Thus we could continue to draw on foreign supplies of food and other essentials without immediately paying for them by our exports during the period of rehabilitation. Now, some six million persons have been released from employment in the Forces and from munitions work, yet certain industries vital for the export trade find themselves still deprived of the necessary men and materials. The excess of capital projects and the initiation of new schemes over too wide a field have stultified the efforts of British industry to refill the pipelines. "Requirements" for materials have been grossly written up, and then, when the Government—owing to the fuel or the present dollar crisis—is forced to impose cuts, the effect may well be to produce a shortage all over the industrial field of particular components that are urgently wanted. Mr. Harrod's conclusion is that cuts in these great capital projects are imperative and should take precedence over cuts in essential consumer goods.

That is what Mr. Eden means when he charges that the Government has shown its worst failure in the broad, strategic planning of national resources. It is the old question of seeing the country's problem as a whole and establishing and maintaining the right priorities. The prime factor for success in any such enterprise is leadership and good team-work, in neither of which necess-

any qualities the Labour Government has made a good showing. Where political courage of the highest order was demanded to resist the pressures from within their own party, Mr. Attlee and his colleagues have too often chosen the easy path, excusing themselves by the need (which the Prime Minister did not fail to invoke) for strengthening and maintaining the morale of the people. Or, lest this be thought uncharitable, let us say that Ministers have been too heavily burdened with the work of their several Departments to see things in perspective, while Mr. Morrison's absence through illness was unquestionably a severe handicap.

This central defect, however, can still be remedied. The technical means lies to hand in the adoption of Mr. Clement Davies's proposal for a small group of Ministers wholly responsible for economic strategy, with no executive tasks—the equivalent of the War Cabinet—to which the new Economic Planning Board should work directly. It is only fair to say that the Government has since the beginning of the year been thinking along these lines. The *Economic Survey of 1947* provides that: "the Government will say what is the best use of resources in the national interest," and now, with the new Supplies and Services Act, it has secured unlimited powers specifically for this purpose. The kind of measures designed to remedy present bottlenecks and maldistribution of labour were indicated in the article "Cures for the Crisis" published in *The Observer* of August 3: the releasing of more men for industry by further cuts in the Armed Forces, especially by reduction of overseas commitments; a lengthening of the working week—at any rate in certain key-industries; a wages policy, specifically one which canalizes labour into bottleneck industries and dollar-earning trades by differential wages; and, finally, greater standardization of products and concentration of production in the most efficient plants. (Methods of compensation for firms closed down could be devised). To which must be added, undoubtedly, a revision of Mr. Dalton's cheap money policy calculated to check the continuing evil of inflation.

All this, however, is therapeutics *within the national framework*—in a word self-help, divorced from the *international* context. And unfortunately, whether we like it or not, it is that international setting which governs the whole situation. Mr. Harrod (in the article referred to above) and other economists talk as if all that is required is a re-modelling of the Government's domestic economic policy. Mr. Attlee himself put intensification of the export drive high on the list of the remedies which the Government now proposes. But what is the use of piling up exports if there is no sure prospect of finding markets for them? It is all very well to set a higher target—of 140 per cent. of the 1938 volume by June 1948 and 160 per cent. by the end of that year. The simple fact is that, in the world as it is, the acceptance of British exports on anything like that scale is nothing more than a pipe-dream.

Already the process of shutting down on British exports has set in—for the

reason that they consist chiefly in manufactured goods. Mr. J. R. Hicks, Research Fellow of Nuffield College, stated the position bluntly in a letter to *The Times* on August 8: "What we have to realize is that we cannot expect an impoverished world to supply us with necessities while we supply frills and furbelows in exchange." As far as the question of exports goes, it means that the dice are against us—until and unless we can resume large-scale exports of coal. *The Manchester Guardian* leader-writer that day reached the identical conclusion, looking at the matter, however, from another point of view, namely the imperative need "to do something to show Europe and the United States that we mean business The greatest contribution we could make to European recovery would be 10,000,000 tons of coal." How fervently Mr. Bevin echoes the same sentiments!

It was left to a Labour back-bencher, Mr. R. W. G. Mackay, in the House of Commons debate to drive home the real and ultimate lesson of present happenings. The United Kingdom's unfavourable position with regard to the balance of payments, he reminded us, dates back to 1913—in terms of actual trading. Up to that time this country was able to buy with its exports and other services whatever it wanted, without relying on the interest from its overseas investments. During the 1914-1918 war some of these had to be sold. But within five years of that war we had largely recovered from that position: in 1927 we had as many overseas investments as in 1941. At no time in the period 1920-1939, however, was this country able to pay for its imports with its exports and services, each year we had to draw on the interest from those overseas investments. This lack of equilibrium—Mr. Mackay is entitled to his Party point—has thus nothing to do with any wicked Socialism. But not only that. The salient feature is that, though international trade as a whole has increased over the past thirty years, the trading in manufactured goods has steadily diminished. (In the nine chief industrial countries it fell by as much as twenty per cent.* And the trend persists. Of those 1938 U.K. exports, which we are now bidden to take as a yardstick, a quarter was in raw materials, specifically coal, which for the moment alas! do not come into question.) This is the direct result of the industrialization of other countries in the New World and the Old, and our position to-day is thrown into sharp relief, particularly, by the prodigious rise in productivity of the United States. America has an export surplus now amounting in value to some twelve billion dollars—U.S. exports, Mr. Dalton stated, are running at the rate of twenty-one billions of dollars against imports worth eight billions—and she dominates three-quarters of so-called international trade. In other words Great Britain finds herself the principal victim of the almost cosmic change that has come over the international trading system on which our wiseacre economists were reared—of the double disequilibrium, accentuated by the war and its consequences, be-

* For a development of this argument see Mr. Mackay's article in *The New Statesman* of August 9.

tween primary producers and manufacturers and between the New World and the Old World. We must never lose sight of the fact that, as the above-mentioned *Observer* article points out, the industrial development of the United States during the last ten years has made our industry, and that of any other European country, "obsolete and internationally uncompetitive." Supposing America switches the emphasis of her industrial production still further to exporting—as she may well be forced to do by her own momentum—and starts to compete seriously with us on the world market, what hope is there of finding a sale for many of the products of the export drive? And, in these circumstances,—with Russia virtually outside the international system—is it not an abuse of words to mander about "multilateral trade"?

The present writer, who is not a trained economist, has always marvelled at the capacity for self-delusion of our economic pundits. As we remember too well, the international trading system bearing the nineteenth century trade-mark, which successive British Governments after the 1914-1918 war did their best to restore, broke down irretrievably in the 'thirties. So long as this country was able to pursue an expansionist policy based on fortuitous but continuous discoveries of gold, and the exploitation of new markets and new inventions, that system of *laissez-faire* capitalism, enshrining the principle of enlightened self-interest, could work. But—let us frankly face the fact—it was our peculiar form of economic nationalism. Given the primacy of politics, which the economists still find so hard to admit and accept, it was inconceivable that, in the changed conditions of the post-1918 world, other nations would indefinitely dance to our tune. Professor Condliffe, writing in 1939 on *The Reconstruction of World Trade** is found observing ruefully: "Sterling . . . was wrecked on the unwillingness of national governments to accept policies of adjustment to economic interdependence organized by private enterprise." But, then, why should it have been expected that the rest of the world would meekly and for all time accept a *British-made* system, the essence of which, as he says, was not in the free export of capital goods but in the existence of an international capital market on a "cosmopolitan" basis, depending essentially, however, on financial leadership from London? That was not the whole story, of course; many irrational factors were also at work, there was the normal interplay of the emotional forces of nationalism and social discontent—and the fact, disagreeable and incredible as it may seem to a professional economist, that public opinion in a particular country not seldom rejects economic criteria altogether in favour of our non-economic values, for example, social security.

After the 1939-1945 war we find the political and financial leaders of the United States preaching the selfsame doctrines of *laissez-faire* capitalism, with the accent more than ever on private enterprise, in a world which has perforce turned away from it and towards national planning—with this country relegated to the status of junior partner. That is, at bottom, the meaning of the

* Allen & Unwin.

whole complex of measures in which the U.S. has taken the lead: the Bretton Woods Agreement, the International Monetary Fund, the efforts towards an International Trade Conference and the dogmas of multilateral trade and convertibility of currencies. What is certain, however, is that this, too, is a version, America's version, of economic nationalism, and the sooner we realize that fact the better. The consequences of following suit are now becoming apparent. The point is that this country was in 1945 fatally committed to a pattern of international economy which is contrary to its best interests—and in any case simply does not fit the facts of the present world. Both Mr. Attlee and Sir Stafford Cripps came near to recognizing this in the recent debate, but both stoutly maintained that our objective was still "multilateral trade and convertible currencies" (their Master's Voice) while admitting that it was "not yet in sight" (Attlee) or "much farther off than had been hoped" (Cripps). The President of the Board of Trade had the grace to endorse Mr. Mackay's reading of the world situation. He spoke of "a historical tendency in the light of which the older manufacturing countries must adjust their economies" and of "the inescapable facts of world development." But he did not haul down the (American) flag.

When the American Financial Agreement of December 1945 was concluded, writes Mr. Nicholas Davenport in *The Times* on August 2, it was assumed, that, "Europe and Asia would be recovering and world trade rising in volume to make the dream of multilateralism come true." But it was only a dream—and for us a bad dream, as the full extent of the war's dislocation and destruction comes to be appreciated and world trade is seen to be shrinking for lack of dollars. To quote the same writer, "not this country only but the whole Western world is heading for a slump born out of an exchange-finance crisis—precisely the event which has been anticipated if not longed-for by the Communist bloc." This process of events could have been foreseen—was foreseen in fact by clear-minded twentieth-century observers like Mr. Robert Boothby.* This *enfant terrible* of the Conservative Party has the merit of perceiving that in this day and age the issue of private enterprise *versus* socialism is unreal and irrelevant to the fundamental economic problem; that the solution of that problem is to be found, nationally, in the assumption by the State of certain strategic controls directed to the attainment of social security in terms of full employment and the stabilization of prices and wages, internationally in the organization of a number of *Grossraum* economic areas comprising countries at much the same stage of economic development. The effective economic organization of the British Empire and Commonwealth, and of Western Europe, that is to say, must precede, and be the basis of, any wider and more ambitious plans for the "One World" of the economic perfectionists. The Washington Agreements, on this showing, were putting the cart before the horse.

But there we are. At present the Labour Government wedded domestic-

* *The New Economy*, 1943. Secker & Warburg.

ally to the ideology of Socialism, is tethered, in the international economic field, to the American way of life, its antithesis. Sir Stafford Cripps, who must be only too conscious of the irony of it, still bids us hold on, suggesting that the Marshall proposals may yet provide the magic bridge. Certainly, as he says, the United States have thereby recognized the fact that the *status quo* is not what the economists call viable, that "a great many small and economically separate nations cannot deal individually with the situation." The stage is set, at any rate, for the creation of a large economic area within which we and the other countries represented at the Paris Conference—who are all in the same boat—could, theoretically, secure a market large enough for large-scale modern industrial production, a free trade market of 200 million people. The States of Western Europe, according to Mr. Mackay, provide about seven-tenths of the world trade in manufactures (and of the ten billion dollars' worth of manufactured goods in world trade before the war seven billions came from Europe.) The British Empire and Commonwealth (excluding Canada and India), whose co-operation Mr. Bevin has promised, together with Western Europe and its colonial territories, possess as great a supply of raw materials and economic resources as the U.S.A. But it is going a bit far in the way of wishful-thinking to talk, as Mr. Mackay and his 'Keep Left' colleagues do, of economic union—"a customs union and a common currency"—as being immediately practicable. And heaven knows what conditions Congress may insist on attaching to any scheme of American help for Europe: more likely than not, any offer will tend to keep up those high prices of primary products which are one potent reason for our present discomfiture—and will be accompanied by other restrictions on our economic freedom which would effectively check our own and Europe's measures of recovery.

It would be a mistake therefore to pin all our faith to a satisfactory outcome of the Marshall initiative. Mr. Attlee observed in his speech that the forthcoming discussions with Washington about the stipulations for free convertibility of sterling and non-discrimination—the strings attached to the Loan—must go very much further than an invocation of the "exceptional circumstances" of Clause 12. And he cut near to the bone when he declared that "unless the multilateral system can be made to work, supported by adequate finance, it will become incumbent for us to seek ways out of our difficulties on other lines . . ."

MR. AMERY'S THOUGHTS ON THE CONSTITUTION

BY SIR ERNEST BARKER

IN the introduction to his four Chichele lectures (delivered in the University of Oxford on the suggestion of the Warden of All Souls College)* Mr. Amery quotes Spinoza in defence—but no defence is needed—of his own *tractatus politicus*." "It cannot be doubted," Spinoza said, "that politicians themselves have written much more happily about political matters than have philosophers." It is certainly true that Mr. Amery has written with great felicity—all the more so because he combines the temper and training of the philosopher with the experience and the authentic knowledge of the statesman. His book will long be studied; and it may even be ranked with Bagehot's book on the English Constitution. It adds to our knowledge of history as well as to our political wisdom. Mr. Amery has drawn a curtain, and shown history in the making. At two periods, in particular, his revelations are illuminating. One is the period of the genesis and development of the War Cabinet (and with it of the Imperial War Cabinet) in the year 1916 and afterwards, when he and Sir Mark Sykes, as political assistant secretaries, contributed their quota to thinking. The other is the period, from 1924 onwards, when he was Colonial Secretary, and as such concerned not only with the creation of a new Office for Dominion Affairs, but also with the discussions which led to the classical formulation of Commonwealth Relations in the course of the Imperial Conference of 1926. But if these revelations are peculiarly illuminating, they do not stand alone. Again and again there are flashes, as when he raises the question what would have happened in 1936 "if King Edward VIII had persisted in his wish to broadcast against his Ministers' advice"; or as when he suggests the influence of F. S. Oliver's *Life of Alexander Hamilton* alike on the form of the South African Union and on Baldwin's conversion into an "apostle of low political temperatures"; or as when, again, he deals with the working of Mr. Churchill's War Cabinet and the difficulties under which it laboured.

It is difficult for one who has lived for fifty-five years in Universities, among men who are 'children in finance' and philosophers without experience, to review the work of an immersed thinker who has swum in heavy seas (like the Ulysses of whom he loves to write) and undergone the labours which dons only watch from the shore. But there is a passage in the *Politics* of Aristotle

**Thoughts on the Constitution*, by L. S. Amery. Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press. 8s. 6d.

which may be pleaded in mitigation, and may serve to parry, in some slight measure, the shrewd thrust of Mr. Amery's quotation from Spinoza. In politics as in medicine—so Aristotle suggests—there are three classes of knowledge, and three sorts of judgment. There is the general practitioner, corresponding (let us say) to the ordinary member of the House of Commons. There is the specialist—the man who has gone deep, and acquired a practical wisdom in legislation and politics—corresponding (let us say) to Mr. Amery himself. There is also, for what he is worth, the man of general knowledge—I am not sure that Aristotle does not call him the "man of general culture"—who has done his best to think about politics (and it may be, medicine too), and who has had at any rate a passive experience which entitles him to some say. Aristotle is sympathetic—possibly, indeed, over-kind—to men of this third class. Perhaps the reader too will extend his sympathy to a reviewer who belongs to this modest class, and who can plead no better title than that of knowing what it feels like to undergo both political government and medical treatment.

Here, and in the course of this article, it is only government that is in question. And in that matter the first thing to be said is that the reviewer, on all the great issues, is not only willing to accept, but also eager to endorse, the conclusions of Mr. Amery. There may be differences of approach. The reviewer is only in the third class: Mr. Amery is a specialist. The reviewer is an old Liberal, and belongs to the tradition of 1688: Mr. Amery is a life-long Conservative, and would perhaps prefer to draw his tradition from the Restoration of 1660. But these differences of approach do not matter when it comes to fundamentals. On them there is complete agreement. Mr. Amery goes deep, and he goes straight as well as deep, when he contends that British democracy is not a sort of 'cascade' democracy, in which the waters of 'the will of the people' descend from the electorate to parliament, and from parliament to a committee of parliament called the cabinet. That may be one idea of democracy: but it is not the British idea or practice. In the British idea and practice there is always present the Crown; and the cabinet, in its essence, is composed of Ministers of the Crown. The Crown matters as well as the People; and it matters for the simple reason that government matters. There must always be initiative, and by its side the responsibility that goes with initiative; and the responsibility and the initiative must always rest with government. Mr. Amery accordingly argues, in the first and fundamental lecture, entitled "The essential nature of the constitution", that the nature of the British constitution is based on a balance and adjustment between the Crown and the People. "The Crown, as represented by the Government of the day, is throughout the active, initiating and governing element; the Nation, as the guardian of the laws and customs of England, is entitled to refuse its consent to any changes in these without good reason given." He adds: "The arena in which the two conduct their continual conference, or parley, is Parliament, in which the Government of the day carries on its work of adminis-

tration and legislation subject to the advice and criticism of the Nation's representatives."

This is admirably said; and this is the foundation. Having laid the foundation, Mr. Amery proceeds, in his next two lectures, to build the superstructure. He also proceeds, at the same time, from analysis of what *is* to constructive suggestions about what *ought to be*. In his second lecture he examines the working of parliament under modern conditions, and proposes a number of ways in which it might be improved. In the third he examines the working of government under the same conditions, and again proposes a number of ways in which that too might be altered for the better. This is political science at its best—political science as conceived by Aristotle, an art of constructive betterment. This is also the core of the argument; and it is informed and nerved by a sense of urgency. "The spatial shrinkage of the world, unaccompanied by any corresponding levelling up or assimilation of ideals or standards of conduct; the almost unimaginable powers of creation as well as of destruction latent in atomic energy; the ever more complex structure of national life brought about by new social ideals as well as new external forces—all these are bound to add ever-increasing burdens." How can Atlas carry the burden?

In his suggestions for the improvement of the working of parliament Mr. Amery shows a radical edge. It is curious, and almost paradoxical, that here an old Liberal should begin to shy; to halt and to wonder whether the axe is not being laid with too much vigour to the roots of too many trees. A cynic may smile and say: "I always knew that you who call yourselves Liberals were the most crusted of Conservatives, so enamoured of the Parliament of 1688 that, as Tom Paine said of you, you grovel before it and humbly pray, 'O Parliament, live for ever!'" There may be a point in the jibe; but let us look at the strokes of Mr. Amery's axe. Some of them may command our sympathy, and even our ready assent. When one reflects on the change in the temper and function of the House of Lords during the thirty-six years since the passing of the Parliament Act—a change which many of its Labour critics appear never to have noticed, but a change which has made it a valuable revising chamber and a forum of instructed debate on general policy which deserves, and indeed attracts, the attention of the nation—one readily subscribes to Mr. Amery's view that better use should be made of the House; and there is much to be said in favour of his suggestion of the creation of life peers, who would gradually come to form a majority of the House, and who might be recommended for nomination by a Committee which included the Leader of the Opposition as well as representatives of the government. Here the axe is discreet, and the grafting suggested is good. It is when he comes to the House of Commons that Mr. Amery becomes more drastic and his remedies more dubious.

He is not enamoured of proportional representation; but he suggests that it

might strengthen the quality of the House of Commons if the method of proportional representation were applied to the larger cities. That may well be the case—though there is much to be said for the view that a single-member constituency is better than any six-member aggregate when it comes to the matter of personal contact and living touch between the member and his constituents. But an alternative method which he suggests for strengthening the quality of the House is far more dubious. This is, in brief, "to increase the representation of the universities and to add representatives from special professional organizations." The representation of universities is an old anomaly (introduced by the wise Solomon, James I) in the general scheme of territorial representation which is the essence of the House of Commons. To increase that representation, and to extend it by a further and indefinite use of functional representation, would be a grave departure from history—and from good policy as well as history. What Mr. Amery is here suggesting was suggested as long ago as May 1793, by Mr. Jenkinson, afterwards Earl of Liverpool, in a speech in the House of Commons. The strictures on Jenkinson's scheme which were afterwards passed by James Mill in his *Essay on Government* may still be repeated to-day: "the real effect of this motley Representation would only be to create a motley Aristocracy."

It is the more curious that Mr. Amery should propose some measure of functionalization of the House of Commons, as he proposes in a later passage that a new functional assembly, with advisory powers, should be erected by the side of the House. He goes back to the memory of the National Industrial Council, proposed in 1919, which was to consist of equal numbers of representatives of organizations of employers and representatives of trade unions, and which was to advise the government on industrial legislation. He recurs to the memory of the House of Industry advocated by Mr. Churchill in his Romanes Lecture of 1930. He mentions, too, the German Economic Council which was a part of the Weimar constitution of 1919; and he refers to the creation of a separate functional advisory chamber as one of the few generally agreed features of the new French constitution. (Actually France had a National Economic Council as long ago as 1925, and it was placed on a statutory basis in 1936; but it was only a body attached to the Prime Minister for the study of economic questions.) He might also have cited similar bodies in Czechoslovakia, in Austria (under the abortive constitution of 1934), and above all in Italy under the Fascist system. Their history affords no comfortable reading. Wherever there is a true parliament, that parliament is the one reservoir and gathering-ground of the waters of public opinion. There is a body called the Trades Union Congress; but it exists in the social sphere—and not in the political. May it—and anything like it—continue to remain there, and to do its service there. "A Third House of Parliament" (Mr. Amery uses the phrase) would either be nugatory (which is what is likely) or a nuisance—and something more than a nuisance. It might so impede the working of

democracy that democracy would be imperilled

The matters hitherto raised in regard to the Houses of Parliament are matters of their composition and procedure. Mr. Amery has also suggestions to make concerning their procedure and operation. One of these suggestions is that of functional committees, either of the House of Commons or both Houses, which would be composed of members interested in the work of particular departments, and would be presided over by the Minister concerned. This is somewhat like the committee system of the French Chamber of Deputies, to which critics have often objected as tending to bring departments of government under the constant surveillance and control of the Chamber, and so to impair the efficiency and the responsibility of the cabinet. It is true that the committees which Mr. Amery suggests would be presided over by Ministers (as is not the case in France); and if Ministers used the committees mainly as channels of information, and as means of keeping in touch with members, the result might be a strengthening, rather than a weakening, of their position. On the other hand it may also be argued that an advisory council or consultative committee drawn from the nation at large, and attached to each department for the purpose both of giving and receiving information and expressions of opinion, would be better still than a system of functional Committees of Parliament. It would be less likely to impair the responsibility of the Minister; and it would keep him in touch with the general currents of thought moving in the community at large. Ministers, moving constantly in Parliament, are already in touch with *its* currents. It is the currents stirring in the general community with which they will do well to get into touch.

The other suggestions which Mr. Amery makes in regard to the procedure and operation of Parliament follow more familiar lines. He is in favour of having Parliament broadcast on a special wave-length throughout the session, for the purpose of rekindling, or rather creating, a general interest in its debates. It may be doubted whether this method would improve the quality of debate (it is a distraction, when you are debating, to reflect on a vast audience of millions outside, including your own constituents); and it may be doubted, even more, whether a constant broadcasting of Parliament would not become to millions of listeners a sad and monotonous thing, leading them to murmur querulously: "So *that* is what you do." A newspaper report which digests a debate in an ordered and lucid summary is likely to leave a deeper and even a truer impression. But more important than broadcasting (which is less of a panacea than we are generally apt to think) is the issue of devolution which Mr. Amery also raises. Would it not lighten the burden of Parliament, and improve its working, if there were devolution to Scotland and Wales and to large provincial units in England? It *might*. But "the restoration of the Heptarchy", as Mr. Churchill once called it, is something more than a matter of the easing of the burden of Parliament; and it raises other issues which are perhaps even larger than that. They are issues which deserve, and indeed

demand, to be discussed on their own merits. This is no place for such a discussion. It is sufficient to observe that Great Britain is a community so closely interknit, through all its length and breadth, that devolution of any subject or group of subjects to a system of provincial authorities would prove exceedingly difficult. For good and evil—and of course there is some evil as well as good in the close articulation (or reticulation) of British life—it seems likely that we shall continue to be closely interknit, and therefore to have our complex affairs all handled and ordered in one central Parliament.

The argument has lingered over Mr. Amery's lecture on Parliament; and that for a simple reason. A reviewer who belongs to the third class, and can only claim general knowledge, may debate with him on some sort of footing (though even so it is still a case of *impar congressus*) when he speaks or writes on the structure and function of Parliament. But when Mr. Amery, in his third lecture, comes to treat of the machinery of government, and to make suggestions for its improvement, he is on his own ground; and few can follow him on that ground. A man who has spent at least seventeen years in the work of government in a number of different departments *knows*; and he must be acknowledged as a master by those who do not know. He concludes, on the basis of his experience, that the cabinet, as it stands to-day, is inadequate to its work; that it is inadequate owing to the sectionalism of departments and the immersion of ministers in their sections; and that what is needed is the reconstitution of the cabinet into a central thinking centre—a '*phrontisterion*' or (as Bentham might have called it) a '*panopticon*'. In other words—the words are his own—"I would have a cabinet of about half a dozen, all entirely free from departmental duties." These *Sex Viri* would supervise government generally; but above all they would have "regular meetings definitely set aside for the discussion of future policy." They would have standing committees to aid them in supervising government; but over and above they would also have standing committees (each with its own research and planning staff) to aid them in studying and formulating policy. They might even have the aid of the leaders of the opposition, in and through these standing committees: "it would be in accordance both with the spirit of the constitution and with precedent if the leaders of the opposition of the day were more regularly associated with the discussions of these standing committees." Here, as in his previous suggestion for the method of recommending life peers for the nomination of the Crown, Mr. Amery stands above party, or at any rate seeks to transcend party. Whether that can be done, consistently with the full responsibility of the party in power and the full liberty of the party in opposition, may well be a matter of doubt. Equally it may be a matter of doubt whether a super-cabinet, acting as a '*Panopticon*', is not too lofty for the national temper and too hard for the digestion of Parliament.

The machinery of government is not only a matter of the driving wheel of the cabinet; it is also a matter of the cogs and wheels of the Civil Service. Here

too Mr. Amery has in mind the need of initiative, and the demand for a measure of creative thought which may serve to help in the formulation of policy. One suggestion which he makes, with a view to meeting this need, is that of a quicker turn round in the Civil Service—a much shorter time-qualification for pension, which might attract ambitious recruits by ensuring them an opportunity of taking up work outside with greater facility. It is hardly clear that the Civil Service would be improved by being made more of 'a stepping-stone to higher things.' There is more to be said for his suggestion that the domination of the Treasury side of the Civil Service should be reduced: that the departments concerned with production should have a larger voice; and, in particular, that the new system of making the permanent head of the Treasury the head of the whole Civil Service (a system, as he says, "not calculated for initiative and independence") should be abandoned in favour of a system which placed the general control of the Civil Service in the hands of the Prime Minister or one of his colleagues in the 'policy' cabinet.

The last of the four lectures in *Thoughts on the Constitution* is concerned with the evolution of the British Commonwealth. Here, above all, Mr. Amery is on his own ground. He has the calibre of an imperial statesman: he has been a great part of many of the developments of which he treats; and the historical review which forms a large section of this last lecture has an historical importance of the first order. Here, too, his conception of the Crown comes into its own and attains its height. He sees in the Commonwealth something which matters more to the world, and to its future welfare in peace, than the organization of the United Nations, which he feels, in view of the incompatibility of the ideals and methods of its members, to be more likely to endanger than to promote the cause of peace. "The only international association that is likely to be fruitful is one of like-minded nations." He would therefore cling to the Commonwealth as a free association of autonomous but like-minded members, united in common allegiance to the Crown. He is averse from any system of federalism, such as Mr. Curtis has long preached. Such a system, in his view, rests on two untenable assumptions: the assumption that there can be a division between 'external' affairs, remitted to a federal authority, and the 'internal' affairs reserved to each constituent State ("the whole course of political and economic evolution has tended to obliterate that distinction"), and the further assumption that government, at any rate in respect of a supposed sphere of 'external' affairs, can be government by delegation from an electorate or number of electorates—an assumption contrary to his fundamental theory of the essential nature of the constitution, as stated in his first lecture. These are words of wisdom: and with those words still ringing in our ears we may fitly conclude this summary view of a statesman's thoughts on the constitution.

INTER-ASIAN RELATIONS

BY IQBAL SINGH

ALMOST apprehensively Paul Valéry once referred to Europe as a small "promontory on the vast and mysterious continent of Asia." Mysteriousness is a subjective quality, but there can hardly be any dispute as to the physical preponderance of the great land mass of Asia in the Eastern hemisphere. It is not superfluous to draw attention to this elementary geographical truth, particularly at a time when a profound change is taking place in the balance of relations between the East and the West. The importance of this change is now universally admitted. Field-Marshal Smuts obliquely invoked this fact to support his pessimistic argument during a recent UNO debate; and Mr. Bevin tacitly acknowledged it in the course of his survey of the international prospects in the House of Commons on his return from Moscow. However, although theoretical recognition of this decisive factor of the post-war situation is fairly general, its concrete implications are as yet but imperfectly grasped by European statesmen, pre-occupied as they are with the urgent problems of inter-European relations.

A correct appreciation of these implications is inevitably contingent upon a dispassionate assessment of the new situation in Asia. There is a tendency, especially among British intelligentsia, to apprehend this situation in terms of constitutional precedents. This is apt to confuse rather than clarify the issues, which are too big to be contained in any constitutional categories. The essence of the change that has come over the Asian horizon is that the world's most populous continent is finally emerging from a phase of tutelage and subservience into the main current of history; that after a century or more of comparative stagnation, during which they played at best a negative rôle in shaping human destiny, the nations of Asia are beginning to regain a certain measure of initiative and freedom of action in the political field, even if the period of their economic dependence has not yet come to an end. Demonstrably, the development has momentous consequences which deserve serious consideration.

The process is no doubt still in its initial stages. Nor can it be claimed that it has been entirely uniform in its incidence. There are complex and contradictory trends which cut across the main line of advance. Even in its present stage, it has set up a whole series of reflexes, which extend far beyond the realm of politics and are revolutionary in their psychological impact. Not the least significant of these reflexes is the increasing realization on the part of

Asian leadership that the problems of the continent as a whole are inter-related and that, in fact, Asian polity possesses a valid and coherent unity of its own. It is as part of this new orientation that attempts are being made to find a durable basis for an integration of Asian relations on a regional pattern.

It would be easy, but mistaken, for western observers to regard the conception of Asian unity as the product of a purely transitory enthusiasm. The idea corresponds, however vaguely, to certain historical necessities, and its genesis may be traced back to the latter half of the nineteenth century when, with the early intimations of nascent nationalism in the East, the nebulous dream of a concert of Asian nations, bound together by ties of common cultural and spiritual values, began to take shape in the minds of the advanced thinkers of Asia. The concept had found sufficient general acceptance by the end of the first decade of this century for Count Okakura Kakuzo to say sweepingly that "Asia is one."

The argument for Asian unity was underlined by a number of developments in the international field. First, there had been the spectacular and unexpected victory of Japan over Czarist Russia: this shattered the myth of European invincibility and helped to restore to the peoples of Asia the sense of self-confidence lost through a century of humiliation and defeat. It was followed by the establishment of the Chinese Republic which provided a stimulus to the democratic aspirations of the national movements throughout Asia. And finally, the Russian revolution, which brought the doctrine of racial and national equality to the once oppressed nationalities of Central Asia and Trans-Caucasia, was instrumental in indirectly strengthening the diffuse, but nevertheless compelling sentimental assumption of Asian solidarity.

The conception, however, remained largely metaphorical until the years between the two wars. It was after the end of the 1914-1918 war that the operative possibilities of the idea of Asian unity began to be studied simultaneously in a number of countries. In Japan, for instance, the Foreign Office, realizing the utilitarian value of Pan-Asian ideas for furthering the expansionist plans of the Japanese General Staff, began ostentatiously to affirm its allegiance to the doctrine of Asian unity and managed even to arrange conferences of refugee nationalist leaders from various parts of Asia in Tokyo as a part of its propaganda offensive. In India, on the other hand, the constructive implications of the idea attracted widespread attention, though there is no indication that they were studied with any degree of precision. In general, the thesis was developed that Asian unity was necessary not merely for the purpose of hastening the liberation of the continent from colonial subjection by presenting a united front against imperialism, but also for securing a stable world order which presupposed free and peaceful development of the Asian nations.

A bold and imaginative scheme on these lines was first formulated by the late Mr. C. R. Das. He envisaged the establishment of an Asian Federation on a political basis as the ultimate objective of inter-Asian polity. Despite its

many translucencies, the scheme was sufficiently gratifying in an emotional sense immediately to commend itself to the leadership of the Indian national movement and soon came to be regarded as an integral part of its outlook on foreign policy, particularly appealing to the younger section of the national leadership among whom Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru was already eminent. By 1928 the idea had crystallized to the point where it was possible for Congress to pass a resolution instructing its Working Committee to issue invitations to leaders of Asian national movements to attend a conference to discuss common problems. The conference was scheduled to be held in India in 1930. It never happened; indeed, it is doubtful whether any invitations were ever sent and for the next few years India passed through a period of intense political turmoil which made the holding of such a conference physically impossible. But the idea had come—and come to stay.

The quickened pace of Asiatic awakening in the period immediately preceding the 1939-1945 war, and even more during the war years, opened up the prospect for India and the countries of South East Asia of a rapid transition to comparative independence. For the first time favourable conditions were created for some kind of practical affirmation of what had been so far a sentimental postulate. This was fully realized in Indian political circles and Pandit Nehru, soon after his release from jail in the summer of 1945, took the initiative. His preliminary and tentative approaches to the leaders of various Asian countries evoked unexpectedly encouraging response and he was able in the May of 1946 to suggest to the Indian Council of World Affairs—a body which roughly corresponds in its function and purpose to Chatham House and the Institute of Pacific Relations—that it should undertake active preparations for convening an Asian Relations Conference. Thus the conference that met in Delhi for about a fortnight last spring represented the partial consummation of an idea which had been tempting Asian leadership for almost a quarter of a century.

It is relevant, before discussing the work of the conference, to make certain general observations regarding the basic issue of Asian unity. It should be stressed that it is not yet, even at the highest level of Asian leadership, anything more than a concept. Its concrete limitations as well as potentialities were never thought out with any clarity. And for obvious reasons. The emotional compulsion towards unity primarily originated in the negative condition of Asian subjection, although all manner of historical, cultural and even metaphysical arguments have been conjured up to provide a convincing justification. Plainly the conception of Asian unity essentially represents an extension of the idea of nationalism as it has developed all over Asia under the pressure of varying degrees of foreign domination. However, the translation of this concept into positive policy pre-supposed a decisive mitigation of the very conditions which had inspired it. Thus at the point where the idea became practical politics a new situation with its own attendant problems had to be taken

into account.

This is the tantalizing paradox confronting the political leadership in Asia in the post-war era. Nationalism, which had until now been a unifying agent, in the moment of achieving its purpose reveals its inherent ambivalence and may lead to the fragmentation of Asian polity just as it did in Europe at a corresponding stage of development. That this is not merely an imaginary fear is indicated by discords which are already heard. At present these arise over relatively minor issues such as the status of emigrants, rights of minorities, or territorial adjustments of frontiers between certain countries. Such conflicts are obviously symptomatic of a deeper process of alienation, the seriousness of which has not yet been fully realized by political opinion in Asia.

It might reasonably have been expected that the Delhi Conference, representing as it did the first authoritative congress of Asian leaders, would offer an analysis which would illuminate some of the crucial questions relating to the task of stabilizing inter-Asian relations on a long-term basis. Unfortunately, it did not. On the contrary, it appeared that the conveners had meticulously avoided mentioning the fundamentals of contemporary Asian polity in the terms of reference. The scope of discussion was almost entirely restricted to matters of a secondary, though by no means unimportant, nature. The agenda for the conference was confined to racial problems, inter-Asian migration, transition from colonial to national economy, agricultural reconstruction and industrial development, the status of women and women's movements, labour problems and social services, and cultural problems with special reference to education and scientific research in Asia.

The only topic of direct political interest included in the items on the agenda was: "National movements for freedom in Asia." However, it was explained that "it is not intended that the conference should discuss such questions as how these freedom movements were to be conducted or what assistance should be rendered to one Asian country by the others. This topic was put down for discussion because it was considered important that the tendency of these movements to lose sight of their original objectives and degenerate into racial, communal or class conflicts required co-operative study." The discussion, in other words, was to be kept on a more or less academic level. And, in fact, it was.

So was the discussion in the conference in general. There was about its deliberations—in the plenary sessions as well as in the group discussions—what can only be described as a sense of inconclusiveness. It was as if, having called the conference, nobody quite knew what to do with it. The group discussions frequently tended to be brilliant in the diagnosis of the problems facing Asia; unexceptionable broad principles were enunciated, especially in the sphere of co-operation of the economic and cultural policies of Asian countries; but when it came to suggesting effective ways and means of implementing these principles the talks seemed to trail off into clouds of unreality, usually ending on a note of pious but uninspiring exhortation.

In a sense, it may be said, the most striking feature of the first Inter-Asian Relations Conference was its limitations. Some of these were obviously part of a self-imposed censorship. The conference, it should be remembered, was non-official in composition, though it is true there were men of great eminence and influence among the 250 delegates who attended it. It was not meant to go any further than a theoretical study of the questions on the agenda and had no mandatory powers of decision. The organizers of the conference did not wish to encourage discussion of the wider issues of Asian co-operation, whether on a continental or a regional level, without first ascertaining the areas of agreement that existed in relation to less controversial problems of Asian polity. Thus the conference should be regarded as mainly exploratory rather than conclusive in its purpose.

However, even after all these factors have been taken into account, certain limitations still remain irreducible unless they are seen as being inherent in the present stage of development of political thought in Asia. It is customary to speak of the Asian mind as though it were homogeneous. Any objective observer at the Delhi Conference would have at once realized the fallacy of this view. For if there was one thing which it revealed unmistakably, it was a fundamental dichotomy of approach and outlook in the ranks of Asian leadership. This dichotomy mirrored faithfully the conflicting impulses and urgencies which characterize the present transition in Asia. While the dominant section of leadership seemed to hover on the verge of indecision, as though inhibited by some deep-rooted hesitancy of purpose, there was a dynamic group which was anxious for radical solutions of inter-Asian problems. It is true that on most points the former succeeded in exercising a restraining influence, but it was the latter group which, despite inevitable immaturities of outlook, impressed one by its firmer grasp of the forces that are shaping the modern world and even a greater sense of the practical. There could be little doubt that it represented the quality of Asian leadership that is likely to prevail in the near future.

A fact of some significance regarding the conference was that the delegations from some of the smaller and medium-sized Asian countries made more positive contributions to the discussion than those from countries like India and China, which might have been expected to give the lead. To mention only two instances, the suggestion for the establishment of a "neutrality bloc" in Asia came from a Malayan delegate and a comprehensive inter-Asian economic and political mutual aid was proposed by delegates from Burma and Indonesia. This affirmation of effective strength and independence of spirit on the part of the smaller Asian countries may be taken as a happy augury for the future of inter-Asian relations. It is a token that, in any regional organization that may emerge, the smaller powers in Asia are unlikely to allow themselves to be used as pawns of the greater or to countenance a big-power complex as the basis of international relationships.

Did the Inter-Asian Conference achieve anything beyond a purely exploratory discussion of some of the less urgent problems facing the peoples of Asia? It did. The decision to set up an Asian Relations Organization for furthering the aims of the conference marks a major step forward towards the goal of inter-Asian co-operation. The danger with most conferences of this kind is that their momentum usually exhausts itself with their sessions. The creation of a continuation machinery, however rudimentary, means that this danger has been avoided. Furthermore, the fact that Pandit Nehru is to be the president of its provisional General Council is an indication that it will not remain inert. It may indeed be expected that, when the conference meets in China in 1948 as has been proposed, it will meet on surer footing. Much will naturally depend on how seriously the A.R.O., when it begins to function, takes its task of instructing Asian public opinion in general and Asian leadership in particular regarding the vital issues of inter-Asian polity. But the initial psychological reluctances have been overcome and in these matters it is the first step that presents often the greatest difficulty.

The conference served another useful purpose. For the first time it provided some reliable data about the attitude of various countries of Asia to the problem of Asian security. The subject was not on the agenda, but informal consultations showed the direction in which Asian opinion is moving. Pandit Nehru in his inaugural address indirectly referred to the issue. While firmly disavowing the doctrine of pan-Asian exclusiveness and any desire to create yet another "bloc" in a world already overburdened with them, he stressed the need for some form of integration of Asian relations as a step towards the ultimate attainment of the larger ideal of "one world."

He did not indicate what form this integration should take, nor what kind of apparatus should be devised to regulate Asian relations. However, talks with a representative cross-section of the delegates led one to the conclusion that far-reaching plans for an Asian Federation or Confederation, such as those which have attracted many leaders of Asian movements, must for the present be regarded as dreams. Equally unpractical is the suggestion, which has found favour in some Asian circles, of adapting the Monroe Doctrine to Asian conditions. That doctrine embodied a unilateral declaration of national policy based on the concept of a preponderant continental power. Any attempts to apply such a policy in Asia at the present stage is certain to be resented. The integration of Asian relations, as far as one could judge from the trend of thought at the conference, is more likely to be achieved by a series of interlocking multilateral or bilateral arrangements of the kind which were envisaged in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. Tentative, though not very successful, experiments on this line have already been made in Asia; there was the now defunct Saadabad Pact and the working example of the Arab League. Under the new conditions, such regional arrangements may be expected to have greater reality and efficacy.

On a realistic analysis, the regional pattern of security in Asia would demand, as the ultimate condition of its success, an overall understanding between China, India and Russia. Opinion on this point, however, is far from being crystallized. The partition of India, contemplated under the new constitutional plan, is bound in some measure to complicate the issue still further and may delay the evolution of an integrated pattern of Asian security. But it is unlikely to affect the problem adversely on a long-term view. For although the Muslim League boycotted the Inter-Asian Conference—in which, paradoxically, the Muslim countries preponderated numerically—the League High Command's outlook on international affairs is barely distinguishable from that of Congress. It is, therefore, not unduly optimistic to predict that the two units of India will be able eventually to work out a joint policy of co-operation in the tasks of Asian reconstruction.

One last point may be made in this brief survey of Inter-Asian relations. The Delhi Conference, besides focusing the problems of Asian polity, indicated the new spirit of self-reliance and self-assertion which is abroad in Asia to-day. It would be well for Europe and America, and especially those western countries which, like Britain, have long historical associations with the peoples of Asia, to take note of this fact. Observers from London, Washington and Moscow were present at the conference and one trusts that they formed a correct assessment of the situation. The need for a re-orientation of Western outlook on Asia cannot be too strongly emphasized. True, the old imperialistic policies are being modified, even if slowly, but there is always a time-lag between a theoretical change of policy and the requisite mental readjustments without which changes in policy cannot be effective. There is, one feels, still a lingering belief among some influential circles in the West that somehow the course of history can be reversed or, at any rate, that the old relationship of dependence between Asia and the West can be re-established in a new form through some sort of subtle *manœuvre*.

This is a delusion fatal to any hope of inter-continental harmony and as such to world stability. Responsible sections of Asian leadership are fully aware of the politico-economic interdependence of the structure of world prosperity as a whole. However, they are in no mood to acquiesce in, and even if they were, those whom they lead would not tolerate the interpretation of this interdependence as a relation of perpetual dependence and servitude for the Asiatic nations. The sooner this fact is grasped in the West the sooner it will be possible to establish a balanced inter-continental relationship based on equality. The finding of that equilibrium is one of the major problems challenging world statesmanship in our time.

SPAIN REVISITED (II)

By A. F. WILLS

AFTER a bitter fratricidal struggle such as Spain experienced between 1936 and 1939, moral reconstruction was bound to take place much more slowly than material. It is not difficult to muster the necessary practical enthusiasm for removing the outward scars of war; but who shall heal the deep and festering sores left in the human spirit? I remember how startled I was when on a visit to Fredericksburg in Virginia in 1938 to discover how the outcome of the American Civil War could still rankle in a Southerner's breast after nearly three generations.

It is not surprising that feelings of vengeance still hold sway in many a Spanish heart. One has to lose one's nearest and dearest at the hands, not of some outside foe, but of one's own neighbours before the immense sacrifice genuine forgiveness entails can be rightly appreciated. I know, personally, of only one family here in Spain which, by a collective act, has plainly shown that forgiveness for the cruel murder of one of its members is inspired by true Christian feeling. As for the Church, it seems as though it missed a tremendous opportunity during the course and since the end of the war. In spite of its martyrs—and they were many—if only its weight could have been brought to bear steadily, methodically, tirelessly on the side of humanity, who knows what stores of love and devotion it might have heaped up for itself in the popular breast? As it is, numbers of men and women young enough to have thrown all their energies into the war on the side of Marxism have definitely been lost to the Church—whatever religious lip-service they may find it convenient to pay—and the Church itself turns to the rising generation for renewal.

However, this generation, too, has been steeped in the general tragedy—albeit in a passive way. It is now growing up in a "provisional" atmosphere characterized by anti-liberal feeling, political indefiniteness, universal black market, bureaucratic corruption. At too early an age life's difficulties and rottennesses have been impressed upon its consciousness, so that it has had to create its own means of defence against a "tough" environment: it has gone "tough" itself.

Not long ago, I was talking with a distinguished lady, the principal of a co-educational school—one of the very few of its kind in the country—valiantly attempting to continue something of the liberal spirit that used to animate the former government-sponsored *Instituto Escuela* and independent

Institución Libre de Enseñanza. Tears came into her eyes when she said how sometimes she and her assistants (mostly unpaid volunteers) wondered whether, in spite of all their efforts, they were not building upon sand. She told me that some little time before my visit a man who was trying to escape from the police was shot at and killed by them not far from the school gates. Everyone rushed out immediately to see what had happened. She said only one or two of the children seemed at all perturbed at the sight of the man's body lying there still warm; most took it all as a matter of course; for a few it even provided a subject for mirth.

I have only room here to touch on the subject of education. For most children it is a question of attendance at either a Church or State school. For some time now a struggle has been in progress between the two types of school, both aiming to get into their hands the greater share of national education. The State schools have been losing ground owing to the size of the classes in so many of them—often eighty to a hundred pupils or more, where it is obviously impossible to teach or maintain proper discipline. Thus, parents who can afford it are taking their children away from the State school to have them sufficiently coached in an independent one in time to be able to pass the *Examen de Estado*, which corresponds to our school certificate. Religion is taught in all schools. Naturally, however, the religious schools—apart altogether from the economic motive—like to think they are better qualified than their rivals to give the child the traditional Catholic background.

Among all serious educationists—lay or religious—I have found a deep concern to make Spanish education correspond with Spanish psychology. It seems that this is a lesson which the Civil War rammed home with considerable force. There is little doubt that in the immediate past there were too many indigestible pedagogic imports from abroad. Indeed, however much one may admire the personal qualities of the knot of men and women of liberal outlook who set themselves to become in Spanish education the "leaven which should leaven the whole", one is compelled to question the soundness of their vision in so far as it might bring benefit to more than a very limited minority of their fellow-countrymen. For, so long as Spaniards refuse to recognize the colour grey—the liberal colour *par excellence*—so long will every subject treated in the country be a matter of black or white. Perhaps it is not so much a question of conscious refusal as one of instinctive constitutional aversion.

In the universities, the Church has made up its mind to be amply represented. Every faculty in Madrid University now has its own chapel* and student hostels are in the charge of members of religious orders. There is nothing remarkable in this in a Catholic country; nor are students likely to alter their habits for better or worse merely on that account. But the Church's active presence in their midst right up to the moment they enter upon a career will

* This does *not* entail organized chapel-going.

be a daily reminder that religion is the natural basis upon which to build any life worth living, any activity worth the effort.

Informed opinion suggests that little output of any value need be expected under present conditions from the *Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas*, which replaces the old *Centro de Estudios Históricos* and its offshoots as the national centre embracing all branches of learning. Riddled with favouritism in the matter of appointments, the *Consejo* may be regarded as presenting, above all, a notable example of elaborate window-dressing.

But the cultural field is not the only one to suffer from serious problems of morale. The public administration is crowded out with hosts of officials, largely composed of ex-combatants and any others with some "patriotic" claim, however remote, to nail upon the State. Spain has for long been notorious for graft in public affairs. However, taking into account the ridiculous salaries paid to State officials, Spanish graft could, in the past, be compared not too unfavourably with that obtaining in other countries. Salaries have not appreciably altered. But whereas, before, there were generally recognized limits beyond which no "honest man" cared to venture, now no such artificial barriers appear to exist, leaving everyone to place his own interpretation upon the precise extent to which he is "deserving of his country".

In commerce and industry, things have reached such a pass that it is impossible to carry on business in a straightforward manner. For instance, firms which have to base the price of their finished product on the cost of raw material find little or no margin of profit if the price of their particular product and the cost of the raw material are both controlled; for, usually, the raw material is unobtainable at the controlled price, and the actual price which has to be paid for it is too high to leave any profit. All kinds of methods have to be resorted to, therefore, to wriggle out of the enforced-price mesh. Exactly the same applies to agriculture, the peasant refusing to be crushed under the dead hand of over-centralization and to accept less for a thing than the actual cost of producing it. He is merely incited to "pass the buck" to the unfortunate townsman. There is the ever-present danger, however, of falling under the ban of the *Fiscalía de Tasas* (Price-control Commission). The remuneration of this organization's officials is derived from the fines they can impose for non-observance of the price-laws, rather in the manner of the Inquisitors of bygone days. It is hardly necessary to add that such a system produces blackmail and bribery in the case of the rich; harsh treatment in that of the poor.

The distribution of foodstuffs, under the centralized control of the *Comisaría de Abastecimientos*, provides further opportunity for administrative dishonesty or incompetence. In view of the very bad harvests of 1944-1945, it may be necessary for the Government to continue exercising some control over prices and distribution. But the whole object for which this department

exists is largely nullified by an excessive rigidity and the fact that other government departments and the provincial governors flagrantly authorize the buying up of stocks wherever they can be found, in order to make themselves as independent as possible of the Comisaría's vagaries. Scarcity in the open market for the ordinary consumer (or the black market) is thus greatly aggravated.

But perhaps the palm for barely disguised jobbery should go to the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, whose Import-Export licensing bureau levies a sort of unofficial tax on incoming and outgoing goods, with at least *this* plainly discernible result. No other capital in Europe can boast so many of the latest and most luxurious models of American motor-car production as Madrid, and none, for the size of its population, has such a broken-down, overcrowded public transport service.

All this from the moral point of view smells—and smells bad. Yet such is the atmosphere in which the post-Civil War generation is growing up. If only education could act as something of a counterweight! But education itself shares in the general uncertainty about the future; how far, for instance, it is to become again a monopoly of the Church? In the meantime youth throws itself with furious zeal into any subject of immediate practical value. Learning for its own sake languishes. Life is too grim a struggle to allow for such a pastime.

General Franco is no saint. Yet even if one thinks him a devil, one must give him his due. In spite of the seamy side to his régime—which it is easy enough to discover—there is no doubt about his sincere desire to promote the welfare of the Spanish people, nor about the long and arduous hours he devotes daily to achieving that end. About his past there is nothing hid, or which need be hidden; so he can afford to be truthful with himself. He had a distinguished military reputation long before he became leader of the *Movimiento*—as it is called. It is unlikely, therefore, that he would be sticking to his present post merely through ambition or vanity.

The danger, in the case of such a man, lies in his trying to govern by semi-military methods for longer than the actual health of his country requires. This is precisely what conservative and liberal opinion alike complains about most. It says: one thing is to save a man from drowning; another is to keep him to his bed on the pretext that he has to recover from that experience, when, in point of fact, he feels as right as rain. The Spanish body-politic urgently requires exercise: it can be given exercise and still be kept from "rushing down a steep place into the sea". This, it says, General Franco apparently cannot or will not recognize.

On the face of it, the complaint seems justified. But one should be wary of unquestioningly accepting it. How many men of liberal opinion who, before the arrival of the Republic, found it hard to find words with which to express their abhorrence of the monarchy and all it stood for, were, after

a year or so's experience of republican government, pathetically forced to recognize their mistaken zeal? How many of such men, awaiting the firing squad during the Civil War, must not have remembered the palmy days when mob-rule was merely something one read about in history books? If the victims ruthlessly cut down on either side could speak, what would be their counsel?

That a number of talented, energetic people should be impatient with things as they are is readily understandable. But, this time, the pace is being set, not for the fastest, but for the slowest. Much leeway has to be made up. Some has had to be made up in the face of extremely adverse circumstances, political, financial and meteorological. Too bad for the intellectuals! But what ordinary people want is a steady amelioration in material conditions and a peaceful transition to some form of constitutional government. The other day I overheard a woman who was queueing up to draw bigger rations than usual say: "If rations like these could be distributed a little oftener, a lot *we* should care who was, or was not, sitting in the Pardo Palace!"—which remark was received with general approval. And this is how the foreman of some workshops, who has had to live through all the political upsets which have recently befallen his country, expressed himself to me: "We have had, in the course of some twenty-five years, a monarchy, a dictatorship, a republic—and now a syndicalist régime, which is by no means altogether satisfactory, but which will be replaced by some other form of government when the time is ripe. Meantime, Spain reacts to foreign pressure like a man who, in a crowd, finds himself being prodded in the back when he is making his own way forward as best he can. He turns indignantly to those pushing him from behind and closes his fists."

If these opinions are at all representative, then what ordinary people want at the moment, above all, is some one with balance at the head of the country's affairs. And balance is undoubtedly a quality General Franco possesses in marked degree. This has been interpreted by some people as merely the expression of a vulgar self-complacency. But that is a shallow view. On the contrary, this balance is the reflection of a powerful inner assurance. It explains why he has gained so many outstanding political victories—notably that of keeping his country out of the 1939-1945 war. It is this same balance, or sense of control, which has placed him, kept him and is keeping him where he is.

Then—it may be legitimately asked—if all this is true and General Franco is sincerely doing his best for the country, how is it that in so many respects the administration is so scandalous? I think the truest answer is that a political artist (if we can be unprejudiced enough to concede General Franco that title) is just as limited as any other type of creative artist by the qualities and defects of the material in which he has to work and by his own individual vision as artist. Obviously a ruthless and bloody social upheaval is not the

best source from which to obtain the material, and the individual vision is a military one. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that, both during and since the end of the war, General Franco has had to reconcile a host of conflicting interests among the various institutions and political groups which gave their support to the *Movimiento*. At the beginning, each one considered itself—in thoroughly Spanish fashion—most truly representative of the struggle against Marxist Communism. Within less than a year, General Franco, to save precisely that type of wasteful quarrelling which was the ruin of their opponents, gave the supremacy to the Falangists. In all “win-the-war” accommodations—as we know to our cost—the bill is presented on the day of victory. Since the end of the Spanish war, this has meant ever sharper and more bitter divergence between Falangists and non-Falangists. In such an atmosphere the execution of any internal policy has to be tempered with the maximum of caution, so as not to precipitate serious sectional loss of support for the Government. No doubt temporizing has gone far enough and a thorough clean-up of the administrative machine needs to be undertaken. But this is unlikely to happen while such intense hostility to the régime prevails abroad.

Though there is no reason to doubt General Franco's strong monarchist principles, or that he has ever had in mind any candidate for the throne other than Don Juan, it is quite clear from the Law of Succession which was submitted to referendum on July 6, that he seeks to make the return of the monarchy conditional on the acceptance of the present national-syndicalist régime as the basis on which to fashion a more liberal type of government on elective principles suited to Spain. Don Juan, on the other hand, claims his right to the throne as an hereditary one, subject to no conditions whatsoever, other than those obtaining at the time of Alfonso XIII's abdication. These would, naturally, include the holding of elections for Cortes embracing *all* political parties. But I have yet to meet the monarchists who regard the holding of elections in such circumstances with anything other than genuine horror.

Meanwhile, the wisdom of the Pretender's action in issuing a declaration recently to a foreign newspaper may be questioned, since it contains statements calculated to disconcert both clerical and conservative opinion. Indeed, it has helped to manœuvre the monarchists into a false position—one in which they might come to be regarded as in open opposition to the régime; whereas, the truth is that, while fully recognizing the services rendered by General Franco and all the forces under his command (including their own) in saving Spain from Communism, they feel that every sensible person must now realize that this régime has served its turn and that a resumption of more constitutional methods of government is imperative. The question at once arises, however, what would happen to Spain during the taking-over period? It is a big question and one in which the Left parties have quickly discerned a golden opportunity.

General Franco can count on three main sources of support: the Church,

which admits that never in its palmiest days has greater deference been paid to it; the Armed Forces, which, in their turn, enjoy great prestige and superior rations to those of the civil population, and the general mass of people, caught, as usual, between either extreme, which prefers the order (with its own particular benefits and disadvantages) it knows to the disorder which it shrewdly suspects—and with what excellent reason!—would supervene on the disappearance of the régime, unless very strong guarantees could be devised to tide over the awkward period while a new Constitution was being elaborated. General Franco knows well enough, of course, how to play upon all these fears or satisfactions to the advantage of his own government's position.

It remains to be seen how UNO will judge the efforts so far made by General Franco to pave the way for a more liberal form of government. These efforts may not seem to amount to very much. But UNO will be wise to refrain from adopting too violent or too schoolmarmish a tone, unless it wishes to see the Spanish ranks closing again round their leader, thereby delaying still further the return of the monarchy, which, in any case, can now only come back gradually and, it would seem, after certain readjustments in points of view—probably on both sides—have been made. This at least is certain: Don Juan cannot return at present on his own terms: General Franco can continue at present on *his*.

(The first part of Mr. Wills's article was published in the August 1947 number of THE FORTNIGHTLY.)

STORM CENTRES

I GREECE

MARSHAL TITO is at Belgrade, and M. Dimitrov at Sofia. And Uncle Sam is in Athens. A war of nerves is in progress, and Greece is once again the scene of conflict between East and West. Already the life of Greece, broken many times by similar pressure from outside, was in a neurotic condition, split into political extremes, racked by poverty. Now East and West accuse one another of causing this latest intensification of Hellenic chaos. In a period of such acute rivalry, what possibility can there be that an international organization may contrive to smooth away the friction? The chances are slight. It seems inevitable that commissions appointed by UNO shall be identified with the one faction or the other. Meanwhile both sides continue the pressure, waiting for the rival force to weaken.

In all the mountain areas that divide Greece from Europe, political idealism and banditry have long been associated. The Greek liberators of the last century were bandits who fought their way down from the heights, clipped their moustaches, and became party politicians. The traditional association of highway robbery and revolution persisted right up to 1939, and was then much in evidence during the Italo-German campaigns and occupation. To-day every purge by the Athens Government drives political refugees up into the mountains, and when they return to the valleys it is as guerrillas. With them there come some of those desperate and hungry 'displaced persons' who are now so numerous in central and southern Europe. Such desperadoes are naturally attracted to the regions where tension is greatest. The frontiers of Greece are not only perfect terrain for banditry, but are also the very point where East and West meet and clash. Here then the guerrillas, consisting of Greek idealists and international adventurers, conveniently serve the purpose of the U.S.S.R.

The present Greek Government has the good wishes of most of the population, but it could not survive without the support of the U.S.A. It is therefore the natural target both of the U.S.S.R. and of those Greeks who resent the fact that their country—almost alone among European nations—is still subject to a right-wing régime. Inevitably this Government is regarded as the successor to that of the late General Metaxás, who in 1936 conjured up the communist bogey as an excuse for establishing a personal dictatorship. Metaxás declared strikes illegal, proclaimed martial law, and deported his opponents to the prison-island of Anáfi. It is true to say that Metaxás was largely respon-

sible for the creation of class-consciousness in Greece. His oppression began the work of forming a really communist opposition.

While the energies of Greece are being wasted in political acrimony and frontier warfare, the Great Powers proceed with the development of their strategy. During recent weeks considerable provocation has come from the Left both at home and abroad. In the middle of July the Greek communist leader, M. Zachariades, from his hiding-place announced that it was his intention to establish an independent 'democratic' government on Greek soil (presumably in the Konitza-Florina area). Preparatory guerrilla operations occurred on a large scale, but without decisive result. Simultaneously wholesale arrests were being made by the Athens Government, while the U.S.A. at Lake Success was attempting to force through a scheme whereby Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria should receive the attentions of a UNO commission of 'conciliation and investigation'. On July 29 Mr. Gromyko vetoed this U.S. proposal. On August 4 UNO rejected by nine votes to two (Russia and Poland) Mr. Gromyko's resolution denouncing the Greek Government and foreign intervention as being responsible for recent developments in the Balkans; but on the previous day Belgrade had published the news of the Yugoslav-Bulgar 'political, economic and cultural' Agreement, which an Athens spokesman described as "the first step in a Slav siege of Greece." The implications of this Agreement are far-reaching. One intention no doubt is to assist the eventual separation of northern Greece and the absorption of that district into the Slav Communist Federation. On August 12 at Lake Success Mr. Herschel Johnson, the U.S. delegate reiterated the accusation that the Slav powers were responsible for Greek unrest; stated that the Greek frontier question would have to be taken to the Assembly; and promised that the U.S.A. would co-operate in whatever action was found to be necessary to protect Greek independence. On August 13 Washington denied that the U.S.A. would send troops to Greece. When the remaining British forces are finally withdrawn "in September or October", however, it is to be assumed that U.S. assistance to the Athens Government and their army will have been very considerably strengthened.

The truth of course is that matters would not have reached the present critical condition, had not the internal situation invited foreign intervention and infiltration. The fighting in Greece did not originate in decisions taken by any other power. It was started by the Greeks themselves after a long period of party political chaos. I recall most vividly a certain starlit night in 1932, when I was living in a house that stood back among the vineyards on the road that joins Kifissia to Athens. That night there was suddenly a shattering din of rifle fire and of bullets clattering into metal. It was an attempt to assassinate Venizelos as he drove past in his car after dining at Kifissia. In my diary of 1934 I have the following entry dated Athens, November 14: "Joined the procession that was marching to the Albanian Legation to protest against

the repression of Greeks in Albania. In Academy Street there broke out cries of "*Nero ibne!*", and we all ran for shelter as the fire brigade came dashing along, spraying water onto the crowd." Throughout the 'thirties local politicians wrangled bitterly, and political parties and newspapers sprouted recklessly. There was a classic remark: "If you do not give me a post in the Government, I will found a party and a newspaper." Greece had still not recovered from the centuries of Turkish domination, the Balkan wars, the bullying and bribery to which she was subjected during the 1914-1918 war, and the disaster of Asia Minor. Then Germany began to rise again. Dr. Schacht revealed himself as an excessively eager client for Greek produce. King George of the Hellenes became a pawn in the political game. Metaxás arrived to impose order but, so doing, intensified the ferment. The 1939-1945 war further increased the wear and tear of Greek social and economic life. Since 1945 Greek politics have been even more violent and corrupt than at any previous time. The extremes are now irreconcilable, and such moderate figures as old man Sophoulis have no following. Foreign Powers of East and West during the past year or more have added fuel to the fire, but M. Tsaldaris and his colleagues are themselves more than sufficiently active in fanning it.

The constant arrests and deportations, the equipping of an ever larger army, the demand for sanctions against the Slavs: these and other similar measures by the Government merely serve to prolong and aggravate the fighting. The only action that can bring peace is a general amnesty founded on a wide and energetic campaign to improve the conditions in which the poorer classes live and work. The chances that the present Government will undertake such a programme are remote. The outlook both internally and internationally is grim indeed.

GEORGE PENDLE.

II INDONESIA

Three and half centuries of Dutch rule have probably bestowed more benefits upon the archipelago than can be said of the administration of most other colonial powers in the areas under their control. It is reasonable to suppose, therefore, that the comparative absence of a "colour bar" and the sending of first-class experts, familiar with the country, its languages, and its culture to provide roads, railways, hospitals and modern cities have been some of the reasons for the relatively late awakening of nationalist sentiments within the indigenous population. Moreover, Indonesia is the sole Asiatic country possessing a fairly numerous population of European (mainly Dutch) descent, numbering several hundred thousand who are partly linked by ties of inter-marriage with the Indonesian population or otherwise firmly rooted in the country by decades of settlement. There is also a Chinese minority of some three million and a long established Arab population of about 100,000, mainly merchants in

the more important cities. The indigenous population, almost 70,000,000, is divided into a great number of ethnical groups speaking a variety of languages. The two most important ethnical groups are the Javanese, about 40,000,000, and the Soendanese, about 12,000,000, the latter mainly concentrated in West Java. With the exception of the island of Bali which has retained its ancient Hindu religious and cultural traditions, and apart from some of the more primitive peoples in Borneo and New Guinea, the majority of the population is Muslim, although important Christian communities now exist in the Minahassa region of Celebes and on the island of Ambon.

The beginnings of Indonesian nationalism were, in the first decades of the twentieth century, of a pronounced Muslim character, and were later strengthened by organizations of a political nature. Small scale outbreaks of unrest culminated in a rebellion in 1926. During the war nationalists supported the Japanese in the hope that they might thus gain independence for Indonesia. When the Allies landed they found a Republican administration established on the model of the Japanese-sponsored Burmese Government, headed by President Soekarno with the anti-Dutch politician, M. Soebardjo, as Foreign Minister. Later moderate elements gained power, notably M. Sjahrir, who has a Dutch wife and who together with M. Sjarifoeddin, the present Premier, favoured co-operation. Laborious negotiations were begun under the chairmanship of Lord Inverchapel, and later Lord Killearn.

While relations improved the young Republic underwent a process of internal consolidation. Its army, the The T.R.I., under the command of General Soedirman, assumed control of the many fighting organizations formed by political parties and religious groups and the provisional Indonesian Parliament, the K.N.I.P. (*Komite Nasional Indonesia Poesat*), was more than doubled by a decree of President Soekarno, benefiting the communists and minority groups such as the Chinese, the Arabs, and the Indo-Europeans, who were given their own parliamentary representatives. This decree was opposed by the largest political party, the Maspoemi or "Muslim League", whose leader, Dr. Soekiman, demanded greater Masjoemi representation within both Parliament and Government, while at the same time rejecting any agreement with the Dutch. A severe crisis broke out when the "Working Committee" of the K.N.I.P. under the chairmanship of Dr. Radjimanwediodiningrat rejected the increase in the number of M.P.'s as "unconstitutional". President Soekarno and Vice-President Hatta threatened to resign, and only a last minute withdrawal of the Masjoemi demands prevented them from doing so.

The Dutch continued their negotiations with the Republic and also arranged conferences at which the future of Indonesia's political structure—as far as it was to affect the territories under Dutch control—was to be decided. Under the guidance of the Lt. Gov. General Dr. van Mook, a conference held at Malino, Celebes, established a principle of an Indonesian Federation in which the Republic would share as an equal partner. Then, at the Conference of

Den Pasar, Bali, the administrative region of the "Great East" was transformed into the State of East Indonesia with Macassar as its capital. This State was given equal status with the Republic, as was later West Borneo ('West Kalimantan'), with Pontianak as capital.

Meanwhile, a Netherlands Commission-General was appointed under the chairmanship of the former socialist Prime Minister, Professor Schermerhorn. After its arrival in the Indies, it contacted the Indonesian Delegation, led by M. Sjahrir and laborious negotiations led to the draft of a provisional agreement at the village of Linggadjati near Cheribon. In Holland the Government successfully overcame the parliamentary opposition of the Anti-Revolutionary and the Christian-Historical Parties, but circles hostile to the agreement rallied to the support of the "Committee for the Preservation of Imperial Unity", set up by the wartime Prime Minister, Professor Gerbrandy, and containing also some Catholics led by the former Colonial Minister, M. Welter. However, the agreement was ultimately ratified, both parties recognizing each other's right to adhere to their own "interpretation" of this agreement, which provided for the setting up of the United States of Indonesia, to be linked with the Netherlands, Surinam, and Curacao in the "Netherlands-Indonesian Union" under the Dutch Crown. All groups of the population were granted freedom to express their own will with regard to their political future, and demands were made by a political group, allegedly representing the majority of the (mainly Christian) population of the island of Ambon, desiring secession from the State of East Indonesia and closer attachment to the Netherlands.

A further threat to the agreement was the formation of the Partai Ra'jat Pasoendan. The Soendanese, ethnically distinct from the Javanese, and speaking a different language, originally possessed a State of their own which was later absorbed by the more powerful of the various Javanese empires. They had been under Javanese domination until the advent of Dutch rule. The Soendanese Freedom Party demanded the establishment of an autonomous state, with Bandoeng as capital, and opposed any inclusion of West Java into the Republic. At a rally held in Dutch-occupied Bandoeng, the State of "Pasoendan" was proclaimed, Dr. Soeria Kartelagawa appointed President and Dr. Koestomo Prime Minister of Pasoendan. The Republican authorities were naturally violently opposed to the establishment of a Soendanese State but will perhaps grant the Soedanese greater influence in the Provisional Parliament.

The worsening of the situation finally induced the Dutch Prime Minister, Dr. Beel, and Dr. Jonkman, Minister of Overseas Territories, to undertake a three weeks' visit to the Indies for information. During this time they did not have any contact with the Republican leaders, and they did not take decisions on the spot. While the two Dutch Ministers thus never set foot on Republican soil, a number of Dutch journalists and socialist members of Parliament, as well as a semi-official delegation of the Netherlands-Indies Government, were impressed by the achievements of the Republic after visits to

Jogjakarta and the Malang debates of the K.N.I.P and the Indonesian Trade Union Congress.

After the return of the two Dutch Ministers to the Hague it became obvious that the Netherlands Government was no longer prepared to tolerate Republican violations of the truce, while the Republicans on their part accused the Dutch of having infringed the armistice. Repeated Dutch requests, regarded by many as having the character of an ultimatum, demanding that the Republican Government should put into practice the provisions of the Linggadjati Agreement met with little Republican response, although the Republican Delegation appeared willing to make some concessions. These concessions, again reiterated as a result of foreign diplomatic activity in a broadcast by M. Sjahrir, were however rejected by all parties in Jogjakarta, including the *Sarap Kiri*—the Federation of all Left-Wing Parties—thus forcing M. Sjahrir to resign. M. Sjarifoeddin, a socialist and Christian, took his place as Prime Minister while Dr. Gani and Dr. Setyadjit—a former Labour Party member of the Dutch Parliament who had recently arrived from Holland, became Vice-Premiers. M. Sjarifoeddin also seemed prepared to make concessions.

However, the activities of Hadji Agoes Salim—who despite his stay on foreign soil—was raised to full Ministerial office and who continued to conclude friendship treaties with the countries of the Near East, were strongly resented by the Dutch who held that the Republic could not claim the status of a sovereign state even under the Linggadjati Agreement. This and the Republican refusal to accept a joint Dutch-Indonesian constabulary again led to a severe crisis. Diplomatic action by the U.S., British, French and Chinese Governments and Consuls-General in Batavia did its utmost to prevent the outbreak of hostilities, but without success. On July 20 the Netherlands authorities started their "police action" which was intended to be of a "limited nature". The military campaign was characterized by very little actual fighting, extremely few casualties, (less than 100 killed, and less than 200 wounded), the rapid advance of the Netherlands forces throughout Java and the Dutch occupation of nearly all principal cities and ports. Jogjakarta and its surrounding countryside were deliberately left unoccupied.

Meanwhile, Australia and India had raised the Indonesian conflict with the Security Council while the U.S.'s good services for mediation were accepted by the Dutch Government which had declared that it would follow a Security Council "request" but not an order to cease fire. The Netherlands Government greatly resents the Security Council's "interference" in what it regards as an essentially "internal" Dutch affair, comparable perhaps to a possible conflict between the U.S. Federal Government and one of the states, and has been supported in this attitude by the East Indonesian Government in Macassar. Thus the international repercussions of this conflict cannot at this juncture be foreseen.

H. H. B. MOSBERG.

THE TREATMENT OF THE P.O.W.

BY T. C. SKEFFINGTON-LODGE, M.P.

THE war was not fought to establish slave States but to abolish them. It was also fought and won to ensure that spiritual dungeons should be things of the past. In spite of these two truisms public opinion has so far been unable in this country to do more than obtain for the prisoners of war still in our hands both here and in the Middle East, a series of so-called concessions. Though welcome to the men these somewhat meagre improvements in their status do not exonerate us from the justifiable charge that our conduct is morally indefensible.

The Geneva Convention to which we were subscribers states that prisoners must be sent home as soon as possible "after the conclusion of peace." It is further specifically stated in it that there shall be no exceptions on the plea of using their labour for reparations. This document to which appeal is sometimes made to justify our present policy most certainly never anticipated the enforcement on Germany of a war policy of unconditional surrender by her conquerors. It was obviously drawn up also on the understanding that all belligerents would have Governments in being to sign treaties, and that the victors in any war would be of one mind about the peace conditions to be imposed on their beaten foes.

It is now well over two years since we, together with our Allies, assumed responsibility for Germany's future and for all her nationals both inside and outside her borders. The story, so far, of how we have performed our self-chosen task makes a sorry chapter in the history of mankind even though the difficulties to be grappled with have been immense. In no aspect of it however have we fallen so short of the democratic faith and sense of decency and justice for which we fought, as in our handling of the prisoner of war problem.

The gradual improvements in the conditions of our own prisoners for which I and other Members of Parliament have fought hard and long are good in themselves. But it is a healthy sign that they have failed to satisfy the public conscience. When the war began many of the men in our midst were mere boys of twelve, thirteen or fourteen years old. To-day they are grown up. The blood and lust and hate of the war years has (inevitably) left an indelible impression on their minds. To get away from any reminder of the war is their ambition and their hope. Yet here they are—inhibited, frustrated, a body of rootless and displaced men eating out their hearts in sorrow and loneliness because they are still cut off from their families and still unable to realize, even

a little, the ideals common to all young manhood.

Not long ago I met a constituent who had been a prisoner in Germany for over four years during the war. He told me he felt ashamed whenever he saw Germans in the country lanes or walking the streets of our towns. To be stared at by those you were once ordered to kill, to feel you must lower your eyes when you meet them face to face because you are branded by your uniform as a guilty man, to carry about with you in an alien land the weight of defeat without knowing what has happened to your wife and your children, these are considerations which constitute the degradation we are inflicting on men whose only crime was to be born German, and to be caught up in the Nazi war machine.

I have talked to hundreds of these men and I am satisfied that Mr. Bevin's recent plea that "physically they are not being injured" and that their retention is "a great advantage even to Germany" completely ignores the mental and moral strain which their long, unnatural detention constitutes. Some 260,000 are still held here, not to mention the 75,000 men out in the Middle East. The remoteness and greater needs of these latter should not escape our concern. I recently signed a memorial to the Prime Minister pressing for a speeding up of repatriation. Since last September the rate of return of the prisoners has been 15,000 a month. This is far too slow. Even the grave economic crisis and their great usefulness to us, in agriculture especially, should not override our obligation to get them home more quickly. To double the present rate of discharge from the many camps and cages in which they live would go a long way towards improving the low morale of the German people. It would also enable the urgent steps in Germany's rehabilitation to be taken more rapidly and effectively.

I would completely revise the conditions under which the prisoners can volunteer to remain in Britain as free workmen, by extending this facility to all under-manned industries. At present they can only stay in agriculture if applied for by a farmer who can offer them accommodation. The directives issued by the French Government for their prisoners are both wider in scope and more liberal in conception than anything we have so far adopted, and we might well draw up and operate something on the same lines here with beneficial results for ourselves and the men. Although no official census has been taken I have reason to think that up to ten per cent. of the men in some of our camps are anxious to remain in this country for one reason or another. The rest should go back as soon as transport can be arranged. At the same time we should initiate a plan whereby those prisoners who wish to do so can volunteer to return here after they have satisfied their natural curiosity about their homeland and their relatives. The adoption of these suggestions would, I believe, provide us with a reliable labour force of at least 20,000 men. If more are needed then I have little doubt that a scheme calling for volunteers to come over and help us at harvest time and when other special difficulties face

us would bring a response from those outside the ranks of ex-prisoners which would be quite surprising. As long as coal in the Ruhr is in short supply many ancillary industries are either closed down or on part-time work. This inevitably means unemployment and the latest figures are a depressing indication of the fact that many men in the British zone are without any regular duties.

The Government will only move if the people of this country wish it. Italians can come back and help us, and have done so in considerable numbers. To treat the Germans differently is wrong, and is merely to perpetuate that form of racial discrimination which was the hall-mark of Hitler's policy. Our prisoners offer us a wonderful opportunity of implanting in the Germany-to-be the democratic spirit we wish to see established there. The proposals I have made will help very greatly to bring this about; we shall find among the prisoners enough friends and admirers of our British way and purpose to influence their fellow countrymen to see this as the only real road to peace.

ANTARCTICA

By FRANK ILLINGWORTH.

INTERNATIONAL interest in the Antarctic has never before been so marked. Britain now has seven semi-permanent outposts in the Far South. Admiral Byrd's recent expedition was the largest in the varied history of exploration, and it was replaced in the Antarctic by the small "unofficial" United States expedition led by Commander Finn Ronne. The Argentine's demand for the transfer to her of British Antarctic territory was followed by the despatch of an Argentine vessel to the Falkland Island Antarctic Dependency of Marguerite Bay, and Chile and the Argentine are now preparing to establish a permanent meteorological station on the Southern Continent. An Australian party, complete with aircraft, is leaving for the Dominion's Antarctic Territories this year in the former American polar research ship *Wyatt Earp*. New Zealand and South Africa are also likely to establish permanent research stations on the Antarctic Continent, and a joint Anglo-Scandinavian expedition is now preparing to leave for the Far South.

Why should nine countries suddenly become interested in five million square miles of wilderness which, apart from its whaling industry, would appear to be valueless? The answer is that now important areas in the Arctic were little more than names on the map ten years ago; recent scientific developments suggest that what came to pass in the Far North may be repeated in the Far South, and if the purpose of the present spate of expeditions is officially one of scientific research they are also designed to test the validity of conflicting territorial claims.

That Britain anticipated delicate post-war diplomacy over the Antarctic is suggested by the secrecy with which in 1943 she despatched a small party to Marguerite Bay: there it built a base within a few hundred yards of Admiral Byrd's old camp. Questioned on the need to maintain a semi-permanent "mission" in territory disputed by the Argentine and Chile and likely to be claimed by the United States, the Colonial Office replied that the expedition was engaged in "secret work". Doubtless this party has put its time to good scientific purpose; but its continued presence and the despatch of two further permanent parties this year (bringing the number of British Antarctic parties up to seven) must appear political rather than scientific to other interested countries.

It would perhaps be as well to define at this point the extent of territorial claims in the Antarctic. The countries interested include France, Norway,

Sweden, Chile, the Argentine, Britain, Australia, New Zealand. The Norwegians claim all territory between longitudes 40°E and 20°W on the grounds that all recent exploration in this area has been undertaken by Norwegians. Swedish and French claims are made on the same basis. On the other hand, the United States refuses to admit the claims of other countries in the Antarctic, and at the same time she has consistently refused to accept the territory claimed on her behalf by American explorers, considering that the partition of the "Sixth Continent" is a matter for the conference table. With considerably less tact the Argentine has repeatedly claimed all territory between Cape Horn and the South Pole, in spite of her lack of interest in active exploration, on the ground that she is the nearest sovereign State; by the same argument Canada should belong to the United States and Scandinavia to the Soviet Union.

Britain has been the foremost pioneer in the exploration and development of the Antarctic. Of one hundred and seventy expeditions since 1502, thirty were Norwegian, twenty-five United States, nineteen French and seventy-five British. Britain recognizes the French claim to Adelie Land (lodged in 1938) and that of Norway to Queen Maud Land (1939). The Falkland Islands' Dependencies, administered by the Colonial Office, comprise the South Orkney Islands, South Shetlands, Sandwich Islands, South Georgia, Graham Land and Coats Land. This claim is in strict conformity with international law, under which, broadly speaking, three stages must be fulfilled in claiming territory.

The first step is discovery. This confers an "inchoate right" which lapses unless the second requirement, "commencement of occupation," is fulfilled. This in turn must be followed by "complete acquisition by occupation," which involves establishing a local administration. The New Zealand Ross Dependency (annexed in 1923) and the Australian Antarctic, and the coming Dominion "missions" to the Antarctic will fulfil the final requirement under international law—"acquisition by occupation."

This stage was fulfilled many years ago in the case of the Falkland Islands' Dependencies, which come within the area claimed by the Argentine and Chile. Discovered and explored by British expeditions, the Dependencies were annexed by Letters Patent in 1908 and 1917. They were taken over by the Colonial Office after the First World War, the survey stations were steadily increased in number until permanent outposts of Empire are now maintained at Marguerite Bay, Port Lockroy, Signy Island, Hope Bay, Deception Islands, Argentine Islands and Admiralty Bay. The last two were those established this year. All have magistrates and a postal system, indicating and emphasizing British sovereignty; those on the South Shetlands, South Orkneys and South Georgia dating back to the earliest days of the Antarctic whaling industry, pioneered by the Commonwealth. It will be seen that British territorial claims in the Antarctic are unchallengeable. The only ground on which they can be gainsaid is the moral one that all countries should benefit from the partition of a new continent. That we have always appreciated this fact, at least in relation to the

Antarctic, is reflected in the readiness with which Britain granted the Argentine permission to establish whaling and meteorological stations, and later post offices, to serve the Argentine's outposts in the Falkland Islands' Dependencies.

An Argentine supply-ship recently called at some of the furthest British outposts in Antarctica, including that at Marguerite Bay, which is the focal point in the present argument over ownership of the Southern Continent.

Marguerite Bay, in the Falkland Island Dependency of Graham Land, situated due south of Cape Horn, was the base for Admiral Byrd's 1939-1941 Expedition. The United States Ronne Expedition now there was the subject of carefully-worded statements in Washington and London last December. The Foreign Office denied reports that the United States had asked for the British party to be withdrawn from its base in this area, "which is part of the Falkland Islands' Dependencies," a denial that also served to reiterate the British claim to this region. The (then) U.S. Acting Secretary of State, Mr. Dean Acheson, replied tactfully that the Ronne expedition was unofficial and should not be confused with the official United States task force then on the Ross Ice Shelf under the leadership of Admiral Byrd and in territory discovered by Americans and not claimed by Britain. The Foreign Office stressed that the British "mission" at Marguerite Bay would, "without prejudice to British territorial claims," move to another site three hundred yards further from the hutments built by Byrd; but at the same time it stressed that there was insufficient room in the Bay for two parties and not enough seals on the ice to provide for more dogs.

British reaction was considerably firmer when, on March 13 last, the Stars and Stripes appeared over the American hutments at Marguerite Bay. The leader of the British party, Major H. Bunce-Butler, immediately took the matter up with Commander Finn Ronne in the following written terms:

I am directed by His Majesty's Government to inquire the reason for the United States flag being flown on the north-west point of Stonington Island. I assume the United States Government has made no claim to this territory and that flying of this flag is merely an indication of the presence of a United States expedition. If that is so I have no objection to the raising. If, however, this flag is intended to represent a territorial claim I am bound to protest on behalf of His Majesty's Government, as this violates British sovereignty and I shall have to report the matter to His Majesty's Government for instructions.

Major Bunce-Butler signed as a magistrate, indicating that a Court of Law had been established at Marguerite Bay. Commander Finn Ronne was quick to reply that the United States flag was being flown from an "American-built flagpole at an American camp," and that he had no objection to the British building their flagpole as high or even higher than the American flagpole. Thus the romance of Antarctic exploration was reduced to the level of post-war international diplomacy, and we can be certain that a British and an American party will be maintained at Marguerite Bay indefinitely. However, it was agreed last June that the British and United States parties at Marguerite

Bay will work together during their coming spring and summer field work. A member of the British expedition will join the American party and a member of the Ronne Expedition will join the British party, which will also have the support of American aircraft. This agreement between the two expeditions ignores territorial claims, which remain a matter for their respective Governments.

This American expedition is in a different category from that led by Admiral Byrd to the Ross Ice Shelf last winter. The former is a "holding force". The latter, comprising 4,000 men, thirteen ships including an aircraft-carrier, and the largest aircraft ever to operate from carrier-decks, served to show the Stars and Stripes in territory which America is one day likely to claim; but it was primarily a task-force to test military equipment under polar conditions.

The search for uranium, freely advanced in some circles to explain the revival of interest in the Arctic, is irresponsible. The geological formation of some parts of the Antarctic Continent resembles that of uranium-bearing districts of Arctic Canada; and it is not unreasonable to suppose that a continent one-and-a-half times the size of Europe contains uranium. Fairly large quantities of many other basic minerals have been discovered there. The New Zealand Ross Dependency is rich in coal, and if much of this is soft and brown and coked by volcanic action there are valuable coal fields in Parker Land*, only five hundred and fifty miles due south of Cape Horn. Extensive oil fields have also been found in Parker Land, which is perhaps one reason for the Argentine's and Chile's interest in this area; and geological formations suggest extensive gold, silver, iron and copper deposits at a score or more of locations throughout the Antarctic Continent. But even if the primary minerals were found in commercial quantities the problem of winning them is not likely to be solved for many years to come. Not only is the Antarctic Continent sheathed in a moving ice-cap averaging four thousand feet in thickness but it is devoid of harbours, lashed by constant and intense gales and hemmed in by immense ice fields.

Nevertheless the Antarctic has an immediate purpose other than its whaling industry. Meteorological conditions over a wide area of the South Pacific and the South Atlantic originate in the Far South, and a chain of weather stations in the Antarctic would prove invaluable to air and sea communications over a major portion of the Southern Hemisphere. One purpose of the Australian expedition now being fitted out is to establish a permanent weather station in the Dominion's Antarctic Territory, and this is the ostensible purpose of the coming Argentine and Chilean expeditions.

It is also thought that the Antarctic may provide data leading to increased knowledge of fundamental physical laws. For example, the Southern Ice Cap offers unique opportunities for the study of cosmic rays, one of the objects

* The American name for Graham Land, there being doubt whether this promontory was first located by a British or an American ship's crew.

of the Anglo-Scandinavian expedition scheduled to leave for Queen Maud Land under the leadership of Dr. Hans Ahlmann this December. This is probably the only post-war expedition entirely disinterested in territorial claims in the Antarctic: aided by aircraft, it will be engaged in glaciology, climatic history, meteorology, geology, and radar research.

A full survey of Admiral Byrd's latest work in the Antarctic is not yet available, but the report that two ice-free valleys were discovered deep in the ice cap is authentic. The reason for the existence of these comparatively warm areas in an otherwise frozen world is a matter for conjecture; but we may have the answer when Dr. Ahlmann's party reaches a similar valley discovered some years ago in Queen Maud Land.

It is thought that in time these (and perhaps other) "temperate" valleys might be utilized as permanent bases for the further exploration of the Antarctic Continent, in meteorology, and in the establishment of permanent research stations for the uninterrupted study of the fundamental physical laws. There have been almost dramatic cures of consumption among men who have joined South Polar expeditions, and sanatoria may one day be built in Antarctica. The suggestion that the Antarctic's ice-free valleys might one day be utilized as air bases on long-distance air routes may at first appear far-fetched. But it is barely ten years since the far-sighted prophesied trans-Arctic air routes, a prophesy that has been fulfilled in marked measure.

The wind blows with persistence in the Far South; in Adelie Land an air-stream fifty miles wide maintains an average speed of fifty miles an hour the year round. Given a means of harnessing the wind, power would be available for the development of the Antarctic's mineral resources. This may be considered the ultimate in imaginative thinking, but it is certain that the Powers interested in the Antarctic are looking far ahead. The days of the heroic dash to the Pole are over. Instead we have a new kind of long-term assault planned and implemented by governments. The present conflicting territorial claims result from the contradictory surveys of generations of explorers; the rival claims of explorers who annexed territory in the names of their governments have added to the confusion, as has the opportunism shown in recent years by countries that took little or no part in the exploration of the Antarctic Continent.

Claims to Antarctic territory cannot be settled until the "Southern Continent" has been adequately explored and mapped. This would undoubtedly take many years even with the aid of aircraft, and its completion would require international co-operation. The coming Anglo-Scandinavian expedition, sponsored by the Norwegian Government and actively supported in Sweden and Britain, could prove a model for future larger international expeditions to facilitate the division of the Sixth Continent.

It will be asked if the prize is worth the endeavour. Who can say? But when Voltaire called Canada "a few acres of useless snow" we knew as little about it as we do to-day about the Antarctic.

CRUSADER

By JAMES MONAHAN

THIS man saw Calvary. Yet little sign
to show he watched a different horizon
from yours, from mine; our trivial, close summits
seemed summits also in his landscape, fading
to those ranges, the same, the day-dreamed. He seemed kind
but only as you or I, with the common kindness
whose flights of wilder charity are clipped
to fit the borders of the cageing day.
Seemed mean no less than you or I, with meanness
of the regular dripping on the virgin stone
that wears a line, a river and a life.
And average driftwood also, such as gathers
the wisps of straws of custom on the voyage,
even finds anchorage, yet one so frail,
so fleeting that it rather seems a pause
in the current's urgency than any gesture
set like a positive rock against the time
between the source and the devouring sea.

But war's a hurricane will not distinguish
or slurring fecklessness or pretty habit
folded about us to a thin cocoon.
The hurricane takes equally, leaves only
the nations, murderous, and the naked man.
We'll seek new, desperate cover then; we'll don—
so much is given us—the great compulsion;
and some will find their sanctuary there,
wearing compulsion like a purpose, holding
their terrors steady through the storm. But most
want subtler comforting and most ask more—
obedient to the drill yet cannot stamp
their hearts to concrete of the barrack square.
So some put on the patriotic story,
there finding mantle and respect enough;

others, the faithful at Utopian shrines,
tailor those fragile vestments to their need
and that, it seems, suffices them. But most
will turn to digging in their legacies
to bring to the light some toy, some amulet
that a boy discarded at a mother's knee—
they'll wear it again to warm their nakedness.

So this man dug with the rest, found nothing new,
only the muddled lines of his tradition,
scraps of lip-service counsel, stereotyped
patter of parents and of dusty preachers—
now quickened to a flower, to a cause.
And this the hill, the dying Galilean,
and this the sun of his world. I say he knew it
not as another prayer-book piety
but as the touch of his hand, as the drum of his heart.
The vision was the whole of it. The reasons
were only the Jews and Romans, witnesses
taken so quickly in his glance he scarcely
saw them at all until our questions came.
But then we found that he had no more fear—
not that the start and the sweat and the sudden cold,
not that his treacherous body quite was conquered—
but at the centre there was no more fear,
other than fear of shame. For shame he thought it
to balance a miser's pound of likely mercy
against a miser's reverence for hell.
And this he thought the ultimate, craven sin :
that those who valued nothing above living
should yet die brave and he be one to falter,
he of the vision and the certainty.
But where the fear of dying had receded
did not the fear of killing come like a tide?
He laughed at that, found it a little thing
to put against the need to risk being killed,
ay, to the limit anyone would face
who faced it because of the rules, because compelled,
because Utopian or patriot,
because most ignorant and blind and brave.
Oh! but the man was rich and gay with sureness,
if right, if wrong, because of Calvary.

He died, not arrogant and not defiant,
believing the blind were braver. But suppose
a more equivocal ending—he, survivor
after the hurricane was done, returning
to doff his brief and high necessity,
to put on all the littleness again.
Would he be glad to shed the clarity
that bathed him, was his courage, was his beacon?
Not that I reckon—rather he'd try to raise
walls to enclose the miracle. But could he
so guard its stark, authoritative glory?
I see him again, oh! much as we had known him
before the simple time: the ivy habit,
the casualness, the smooth, the slow, corroded
channel the waters wore through days and days.
I see him circumscribed in our horizon—
unease faint at the edge of it, a sense
of some more towering prospect, all forgotten
save that he thinks that once he knew it well.
I see him easy in his native hills,
his boundary, and there the trumpets dying,
that once had heralded his lost crusade.

THE NATURE OF POETRY

BY RICHARD CHURCH

A RISTOTLE began his definition of poetry with these words: "Epic poetry and Tragedy, as also Comedy, are all, viewed as a whole, *modes of imitation.*" Towards the end of his famous fragment, the foundation of all constructive criticism, he says this: "The poet being an imitator just like the painter or other maker of likenesses, he must necessarily in all instances represent things in one or other of three aspects, either as they were or are, or as they are said or thought to be or to have been, or as they ought to be."

Now that definition seems to me to be final. Everything is included, so long as it has existed either in nature or in the mind of man as an ideal or fantasy. You see, even, how by those last few words, "or as they ought to be", the wise old Grecian biologist covers the whole of sociology, morals and politics. No critic, and no practising poet, has ever been able to evade the responsibility which Aristotle's definition has put upon the art of poetry. It was reflected in Milton's great mind when he set out on the long journey of his *Paradise Lost*, his purpose to "justify the ways of God to Man." At the beginning of another of the monumental poems in our language, Robert Browning retold Aristotle's definition in his own picturesque way. He spoke it as a challenge, because the place of poetry in his time, the boastful period of the Age of Industrialism, had become obscured.

But the thing that troubles us, with a divine unrest, is the very universality of all this. Talking about poetry in this way embraces so much that it might as well have no bounds at all. It is so broad a definition that it ceases to be a definition. And where does it leave us? Well, it has left us debating for the last two thousand years, and it leaves us still debating to-day, battling our way towards some sort of re-statement of the idea that has been hovering in the mind of man for so many centuries. It is obvious that a precise, mechanical definition, stated with scientific objectiveness, cannot satisfy us. We know poetry to be something more than a mere plastic medium, of words, or paint, or modulated tones. It is more subjective than that. It is a condition of the mind and the senses, a force that troubles us. We have to try to find out in what way, and under what conditions, it troubles us, and toward what end. Mechanics is not enough. Plato knew that; he was afraid of the forces latent in poetry; he saw danger even in the forms of poetry. He said in *The Republic*:

Suppose then, that an individual clever enough to assume any character and give imitations of anything and everything should visit our country and offer to perform his compositions, we shall bow down before a being with such miraculous powers of giving pleasure; but we shall tell him that we are not allowed to have any such person in our commonwealth; we shall crown him with fillets of wool, anoint his head with myrrh, and conduct him to the borders of some other country. For our own benefit, we shall employ the poets and story-tellers of the more austere and less attractive type, who will reproduce only the manner of a person of high character and, in the substance of their discourse, conform to those rules we laid down when we began the education of our warriors.

You see the difference; between Aristotle's attempt at a scientific definition, and Plato's realistic one. For I want to point out something which so many people overlook to-day: science is not necessarily realistic. All this, however, is so big a subject that to venture on it now is to risk being swamped by metaphysics, and the reconsiderations of the authority of science in modern life. That authority is being challenged to-day. The mob-mind, that once attributed magic powers to priest-craft, still tends to believe that the scientist is the substitute for the old Presbyter. Magic-mongering is something that will never quite die out; and its last refuge will be in the mass-mind, that belated, inert power of darkness which statesmen labour in vain to control. In the consideration of these matters, however, lies the root of the true nature and function of poetry.

It leads to the belief that poetry is a power of life itself, and not a mere mechanical imitation. That being so, the philosopher has to start on a new journey, exploring the dark interior of a continent which may be called aesthetics. But I prefer to call it reality; the very stuff of life—yes, and death too; for this way of looking at the universe does not, any longer, trust to frontiers and hedges. Life and death are part of the same adventure. It is an exciting adventure, and its reasoning is so beautiful that sometimes it seems almost to make the heart stop beating—that sensation which becomes a loss of sensation; that religious moment which is too ecstatic to last, but is unforgettable, and an influence for the rest of our lives. The philosophers of our time have already set out on the exploration. I think especially of Bergson, Croce, Santayana, who have specialized in the analysis of the enormous part played by aesthetics, or *reality*, in the desires and doings of man; also, perhaps, in the functioning of what we used to call inanimate nature. Neither the word inanimate, nor the word nature, is large enough to-day to contain the whole of our conception of these things.

From all this, it may be thought I am a disciple of the Romantics who at the beginning of the nineteenth century made such heroic claims for the poet and his place in society. You remember how Shelley and Wordsworth both wrote lengthy definitions of poetry, giving it a hierophantic authority. Wordsworth made the poet a sort of Senator of the Parliament of Man, to whom the working and legislations of humanity must be referred. What he says points the way directly to the discovery which I am trying to make here. It

leads us at once into a wider appreciation of the part that poetry plays in our daily lives, whether we are conscious of it or not. Here are his words:

Poetry is the breath and finer spirit of all knowledge. It is the impassioned expression which is in the countenance of all science. Emphatically may it be said of the poet, as Shakespeare said of Man, "that he looks before and after." He is the rock of defence for human nature; an upholder and preserver, carrying everywhere with him relationship and love. In spite of difference of soil and climate, of language and manners, of laws and customs; in spite of things silently gone out of mind, and things violently destroyed (how appropriate that phrase is to-day!) in spite of these things, the Poet binds together by passion and knowledge the vast empire of human society, as it is spread over the whole earth, and over all time. The objects of the Poet's thoughts are everywhere. *Poetry is the first and last of all knowledge*—it is as immortal as the heart of man.

And now come words that are a direct prophecy of events hanging over our heads to-day, with the coming of the Atomic Age. You can almost see Wordsworth peering into the future out of those deep-sunk, cavernous eyes of his. "If the labours of men of Science should ever create any material revolution, direct or indirect, in our condition, and in the impressions which we habitually receive, the Poet will sleep then no more than at present."

We are in the middle of that "material revolution" of which Wordsworth speaks. He saw only the clumsy, alchemical beginnings of it. We see it now looming almost like Apocalypse; and those people who have any imagination at all, those who have any sense of responsibility toward mankind, its tragic story in the past, and toward its problematic future, are shaken by fear. We know, more clearly than ever, that objective knowledge, as accumulated by the executive genius of man, through law, science and politics, is totally lacking in moral significance. It is nothing but the raw material out of which we are to rebuild that single, unified habitation, the House of Man. And that building is a process of creating order out of the digressive riches, the luxury of information, which Science has piled up during the last two centuries.

But what is the secret of this moral responsibility? That question brings us back again to the search for the true nature of poetry, and in particular to a quotation from Shelley:

The great secret of morals is love; or a going out of our nature, and an identification of ourselves with the beautiful which exists in thought, action, or person, not our own. A man, to be greatly good, must imagine intensely and comprehensively; he must put himself in the place of another and of many others; the pains and pleasures of his species must become his own. The great instrument of moral good is the imagination; and poetry administers to the effect by acting upon the cause. Poetry enlarges the circumference of the imagination.

I hope that I am not building up a false or restricted impression by all these references to moral good, and so forth. Be sure that the poet has nothing to do with the regulation of human conduct. He does not regulate it, he inspires it. His job is neither that of a priest nor a schoolmaster. On the contrary, he urges his fellow creatures to jump over the dogma of the priest

and the curriculum of the schoolmaster. His way of looking at things is, as Shelley says, the way of love. That is, the way of pleasure, enthusiasm, sympathy, intuition, the expression of the positive side of your nature; the side that takes hold of experience with both hands, and revels in it.

I have said what poetry is not. It is not a mere verbal technique, a tool bag of the grammarian. It is not a sermon, preached against the sinner. It is not a lesson intended for the ignorant. For once again like love, poetry moves in the mind of the sinner and the illiterate as freely as it does in that of the saint and the scholar. But that freedom implies moral responsibility. You see, I am beginning to doubt the possibility of saying what poetry is. Perhaps it is like the British Constitution. Has anybody ever tabulated the British Constitution? No, but it is the most coherent, the most unassailable of any amongst the nations of the world. All the rest, so logically prescribed, are brittle in comparison, and from time to time have to be patched together again after revolutions and wars have tumbled them down. But wars, or indeed any of the major experiences of life, seem to leave poetry only the more virile. The poetic element in our nature feeds on disaster. The troubles of our life often destroy all the superstructure which we build on the foundation of that nature. But after the storm the foundation stands there, fully exposed to view. And we see that it is the thing which I am trying to define; the prime motive by which we make our lives coherent, whole. We may call it by many names; intuition, instinct, faith, religion. Its real name is poetry.

John Keats, in one of his letters, spotted the truth that poetry is a power within ourselves that neither preaches nor teaches. He said the poet "works by a negative capability." Again he put his finger on the point when he said that the poet is a man who "hops with the sparrow on the gravel path." It is the whole thing in a nutshell. It is the power of becoming, through intense sympathy, the thing which you are watching. In another letter Keats said that the poet is nothing more than a mirror, reflecting his environment. But how much more that mirror is than the intellectual machine of the scholar, the priest, the legislator, those people who sit in authority over human society.

So the poet is a mirror, a creature of 'negative capability'. That is to say, he approaches every new experience without any pre-conception; as far as possible, without any personal colouring, either of conscious memory or knowledge. He is perpetually ignorant and innocent, and looks at everything with excitement and wonder, as though for the first time. That is the meaning of 'negative capability'. But his ignorance and innocence are not the sign of dullness of mind, or lack of experience. They are due to a highly developed mental digestion, which completely absorbs all that he learns by scholarship or by living.

The way of poetry is the way of life. The bird singing, the lion sitting motionless upon a rock, the child leaping and dancing on the sand by the sea-

shore; all that is done through the mechanism of poetry. Not by laborious and conscious thought. And underlying our more deliberate processes; our politics, our international conferences and the like; underlying the argument and the legalities of those slow-moving affairs, there lurks the hidden authority of poetic impulse, directing men on to a rough justice, beyond the reach of the deliberations which have been going on for so long. Is this thing, then, no more than instinct? You might also call it faith. We can be sure of one thing, that we are able to judge the power of poetry not in its roots but only in its flower. So it comes to light again and again in the most unexpected people. In *All's Well that Ends Well* (a title most apt to our argument!) Shakespeare makes his Helena say,

He that of greatest works is finisher,
Oft does them by the weakest minister:
So holy writ in babes hath judgment shown,
When judges have been babes; great floods have flown
From simple sources; and great seas have dried,
When miracles have by the greatest been denied.
Oft expectation fails, and most oft there
Where most it promises; and oft it hits
Where hope is coldest, and despair most fits.

Here is an indication, by the most mighty of all poets, of the way in which life and hope are maintained in us when all the evidence points the way to defeat. In June 1940 the whole English people made a gesture that was the gesture of poetry. It was illogical, it was unacademic. By all the rules of the learned, England as a power and as a conception was broken in 1940. But she stepped back, against the wall of poetry, and stood there. The result can be summed up in another quotation from *All's Well that Ends Well*. The King says to Helena:

Methinks in thee some blessed spirit doth speak
His powerful sound within an organ weak:
And what impossibility would slay
In common sense, sense saves another way.

We need this power to-day: the power of poetry, in a world that is being choked in statistics and arid legalities. The individual, without privacy of soul and the sacred right to a self-chosen way of life, is being threatened once more. In the past, with society ordered on a predatory basis, with might being right, the individual was enslaved by brute force, by some bigger neighbour. To-day a cold abstraction is getting at him; an ideology, a trick of the money-market, an Order in Parliament. The way of immediate, happy and natural human relationship is being clogged. And despair and cynicism are setting in again. If we let that mood control us, then the end of the human race is in sight.

But is it really possible to believe that this logical absurdity will finally engulf us? Or do we know, *in our bones*, (that is, poetically) that suddenly something will break, some tension give way, and the sweet force of Shakes-

pearean common-sense emerge, from which "some blessed spirit doth speak"? I believe that. And the blessed spirit is that thing which I have been trying to locate, and give a definition. If I have succeeded, it is rather by saying what it is not than what it is. But I know it is the only hope we have, because it is the only way of knitting together all our various faculties, from the animal to the divine, with which we make our way in this world. Our only hope—in these years after what is practically a decade of horror and destruction. We have seen, in our generation, the break-down of civilization, and the sudden—and also gradual encroachment of bestiality and ignorance. The sweet things of life, the fastidious and tender things, the gentle approaches and the subtle understandings in the light of tradition; all these have been damaged, and in some parts of the world utterly destroyed. But still we do not despair. We have a cause for hope. It lies in that faculty for disinterested poetry which finds a meaning behind meaning, a perfect type behind the imperfect example here and now. That is what Plato saw over two thousand years ago.

CORRESPONDENCE

RUSSIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

To the Editor of THE FORTNIGHTLY,
Sir,

The June issue of your esteemed magazine carried an article by Mr. Walter J. Kolarz, entitled "Russia and the Middle East." Unfortunately, this article contains a number of biased and distorting statements which may give the uninitiated reader an incorrect idea about the policy of the U.S.S.R. in the East. May I hope that in the interests of truth and objectiveness you will not decline to give me, a Soviet journalist making a study of Eastern problems, space for some critical remarks on the above-mentioned article in THE FORTNIGHTLY?

Mr. W. J. Kolarz proceeds from the entirely unfounded assumption that the U.S.S.R. is allegedly pursuing expansionist aims in the East. He apparently regards this assertion as some sort of a "generally acknowledged axiom" for he does not even take the trouble to cite any facts in substantiation of his statement. And yet it is in complete contradiction with all the well known facts. Throughout the thirty years of its existence, the Soviet State has never demanded any foreign territories, zones of influence or privileges incompatible with the sovereignty of other nations. On the contrary, unlike some other powers, it has consistently and undeviatingly denounced the policy of imperialist expansion. Ever since its origin, it has based its relations with the Eastern countries on the principles of complete equality and absolute respect for their sovereignty. Allow me to recall that it has voluntarily renounced, on its own initiative, all the advantages and privileges formerly enjoyed by Russia under the unequal treaties and capitulations, setting no conditions and demanding no compensation. In particular, the Soviet Government completely renounced the policy of domination pursued by Czarist Russia with regard to Iran; it withdrew on its own initiative the Russian troops from that country, and transferred without any compensation the extensive Russian concessions to the Iranian state. This policy has no precedent in the history of international relations, and, as is generally known, the attitude of other great powers towards the Eastern nations is quite different to this day.

The U.S.S.R. maintains no troops, no military or air bases outside its borders in the Middle East; this cannot be said of some other States, which exert themselves in exposing "red imperialism", ascribing to the Soviet Union the most absurd and fantastic designs. The Soviet Union has not sent any military missions, economic or financial "advisers" to the Eastern countries. It is known that neither Millspaugh, whose "financial" direction caused no little damage to Iran, nor Schwartzkopf, now heading the Iranian *gendarmerie*, nor John Glabb-Pasha, commander of the "Arab legion", nor Lansford who has secured control over the Turkish army, are "Soviet agents". The oil companies which practically absorbed Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia into their own countries, do not belong to the U.S.S.R. The large squadrons appearing with increasing frequency in the Eastern Mediterranean to back up the claims to domination of some powers are not sailing under the Soviet flag. And it is not the Soviet Government that is concluding agreements for "financial aid" which are converting the Near Eastern countries into military bases of foreign powers and allowing foreigners to dominate their economy. But all this does not prevent Mr. Kolarz from seeing a

"menace" to the Middle East from the direction of the U.S.S.R.

Inventions about the Soviet "expansionist plans" have lately become the favourite keynote of the vicious propaganda which poisons the international atmosphere and sows seeds of discord among nations to the detriment of peace. From time to time public opinion is treated to a fresh "sensation" about "Soviet preparations for aggression", "concentration of Soviet troops" on the Turkish and other borders, etc. Mr. Kolarz does not resort to crude inventions which may be rapidly exposed by the course of events. He clearly realizes that it is impossible to try endlessly to deceive public opinion by absurd fables about an "inevitable Soviet invasion" of the neighbouring countries. But he makes up for it by inventing a new aspect of the "Soviet menace". According to Mr. Kolarz, this menace consists in the moral influence exerted by the economic and cultural development of the Soviet nationalities of Central Asia and Transcaucasia—the Uzbeks, Tajiks, Azerbaijanians, Armenians and Georgians—upon the peoples of the backward neighbouring countries. He sees a "menace" in the fact that bordering on these States are no longer the desolate hinterlands inhabited by oppressed nationalities with a culture frozen at a low level, as was the case under the Czarist régime, but industrialized and culturally advanced republics, where the people enjoy all the benefits of contemporary civilization. Baku, complains the author, has become a Mecca for Azerbaijanians of Iran. Stalinabad has developed into a large centre with a population of 100,000, with a fine theatre and a state library, threatening to outgrow Kabul, as it has already outgrown Herat. With unconcealed anxiety Mr. Kolarz writes: "The attraction of a modern city with big white buildings and trolley-bus lines making its appearance in the once most neglected part of Central Asia is calculated to be irresistible to its neighbours and may indeed prove so to be."

No less "concern" is caused to Mr. Kolarz by the progress of Soviet Armenia. He does not deny the fact that the U.S.S.R. has saved the Armenians from complete physical extermination by Turkey. He honestly recognizes that Armenia, with her textile mills of Leninakan, the chemical enterprises of Kirovakan, the machine tool plants and scientific institutions of Yerevan, has progressed from a neglected agrarian region into a highly industrialized country which derives forty-five per cent. of her income (as against fourteen per cent. before the Revolution) from industrial production. It would seem that this progress should give profound satisfaction to all those who do not adhere to the racial theories which maintain that all small nations must live in a state of eternal backwardness. But the author suddenly draws an add conclusion to say the least: that the "menace to Turkey" emanates precisely from the fact that "Soviet Transcaucasia is developing at a tremendous pace, while Eastern Anatolia is in a state of relative stagnation. The existence of Yerevan, and also of Batum and Tiflis in Soviet Georgia is a challenge to North-Eastern Turkey similar to the challenge of Baku to North-Western Persia and of Stalinabad to Afghanistan."

I do not deny the fact that the sharp contrast between the cultural and economic development of the Soviet Central Asian and Transcaucasian republics, and the backwardness of the neighbouring countries is bound to exert a considerable moral and psychological influence on the population of the latter countries. And, indeed, lying on one side of the border are countries where power stations, irrigation systems, large industrial enterprises are being built, which have modern cities with universities, theatres, libraries, model hospitals, where tractors and combine harvesters are employed in the fields, where the people take an extensive part in the administration of their country, where they study in their native language and are free to develop their national literature and art, and on the other side—is the typical spectacle of Asia frozen in a state of centuries-old backwardness; regions where the land is cultivated with the primitive wooden plough, where handicrafts prevail, where culture and education are lacking.

The very same nationalities which to the North of the border have their own universities, are to the south of the border denied even the right to study in their native language in the elementary schools. It is clear that under such circumstances the population is bound to make comparisons unfavourable to the régimes prevailing in their own countries and to appreciate the advantages of the system which introduced a different order.

But Mr. Kolarz is profoundly mistaken when he tries to explain the concern of the Soviet Government for the borderland of our country by fantastic "expansionist" designs. The U.S.S.R. is a multi-national state which for the first time in history properly solved the national problem on the basis of complete equality of the peoples inhabiting it. This principle would have remained a theory if it were not carried into practice, if all the necessary material and cultural conditions were not created to secure practical equality for all the nationalities constituting the U.S.S.R. The borderlands of Russia are in a state of age-old backwardness. The Soviet Government spared no efforts to raise them to the level of the advanced Soviet republics and ensure them the opportunities for a life as good as in those republics. Mr. Kolarz is profoundly mistaken when he thinks that "white cities", trolleybus lines, power stations, theatres and libraries are being built for the sole purpose of luring the Tajiks, Azerbaijanians and Armenians across the borders. They are arising also in the Siberian taiga, in the Far North, in what was but recently the most neglected outlying corner of the Union. It is rather astonishing that he should say the Firdousi anniversary celebrations, or the lively interest displayed by the U.S.S.R. in Nizami and Navoi, the brilliant poets of the past, are explained by "propaganda" aims. The Soviet intelligentsia holds the cultural heritage of the past in high esteem. We are observing not only the anniversary of Firdousi, but also of Shakespeare, Balzac and Pasteur. It is natural of course that the great men of our own peoples should be particularly close to us. If we read, publish and study Nizami and Navoi, it is not because we are trying to influence the foreign Azerbaijanians and Tajiks, but because their names are part and parcel of the history of the peoples which make up the united fraternal family of the U.S.S.R. Walter Kolarz ascribes to us the trend of thought characteristic of other States. That is why he sees "a menace to Afghan oil" in Aibek's poetical book about Navoi, which gives a truthful picture of the historic events of the past and of the great poet.

It is characteristic that the author maintains inexplicable silence concerning responsibility for the backwardness of the Middle-Eastern neighbours of the U.S.S.R. Far from suffering from the war, Turkey derived tremendous profits from her trade with Germany at a time when the Hitlerites were fighting against all the freedom-loving nations. She had every possibility of means to an improvement in the position of Eastern Anatolia. But it is a fact that the Turkish rulers manifested no interest in this matter. This is not difficult to understand if it is remembered that the population of this region is composed largely of ethnic minorities: Armenians, Kurds and Lazi, whom Turkish reaction, which worships racial ideas, denies even the rights of citizenship. Kars, Ardagan and Erzerum remain neglected, declining towns, as is the case with most of the provincial Turkish towns. But Ankara did spend during the last five years about 2,500 million lire on its military schemes, and without any need whatever is contemplating the allocation of further hundreds of millions for the construction of "new Singapores", military aerodromes, unprofitable strategic railways and army barracks. At a time when the Turkish people are protesting without any result against this insane waste, it is being energetically encouraged and even financed by foreign imperialist circles. It is clear that under these circumstances Eastern Anatolia is doomed to remain for a long time in its present state of desolation.

The Azerbaijanians of Iran tried to establish an autonomous régime in their country,

in order to lift it from its ancient backwardness and secure human conditions of life for its population, without harbouring any intention of separation from Iran. But the Iranian Government, obviously urged on and supported from outside, launched cruel oppression against them. Who is to blame then if Iranian Azerbaijan is destined to remain a savage borderland, and Baku is regarded as a Mecca by its population?

We do not know whether Mr. Kolarz realizes how slippery is the road suggested by him when he describes the peaceful construction in the Soviet border republics as "dangerous" on the pretext that it represents a "menace" to the neighbouring backward States. There is but one step from this to the assertion that any progress of any State is allegedly fraught with danger to others. There is hardly any need to prove that this "worship of backwardness" has nothing in common with the contemporary ideals of the nations.

Yours faithfully,

V. STAMBULOV.

8, Stankevich St.,
Apt. 1,
Moscow,
U.S.S.R.

THE MARSHALL OFFER

To the Editor of THE FORTNIGHTLY,
Sir,

I found it significant that the three contributions on the Marshall offer in the August issue of *THE FORTNIGHTLY* were typical of the three stages in the world's reaction. The first was unconditionally enthusiastic, like the general reception of the offer. The second, the economic analysis, is already the expression of the European scrutiny which, inevitably, followed the initial enthusiasm. The third contained a good summary of the American attitudes which make Europeans reluctant to accept outright such a seemingly fabulous offer.

Mr. Schwarz's exceptionally able summary of the economic background once again convinced me of the efficacy of economic analysis as the safest method to get to the roots of contemporary problems. His contribution seemed to me particularly valuable because it explained briefly and convincingly that the Marshall offer means no less than the official burial of the Bretton Woods utopia which meant an attempt to resurrect the economic system of the nineteenth century with the help of American administered artificial respiration. The world will be one step nearer to a reasonable approach to our problems if this fact is more widely accepted.

As for Mr. Nicholas's interpretation of the American attitude toward European nationalism it is somewhat exaggerated to accept the comparison with the American Civil War that led to inter-state unity. The perspective of three thousand miles may compel Americans to view European sovereignties in the length of kilometers. But the realities of neighbourhood compel Europeans to feel in depth of centuries. The French reaction to the American plans in the Ruhr ought to be convincing enough to warn the Americans against this fallacy.

Yours faithfully,

TIBOR MENDE.

Paris.

THE FORTNIGHTLY LIBRARY

INSTRUCTION FOR FARMERS

BY S. L. BENSUSAN

BETWEEN the beginning of the sixteenth century and the opening of the eighteenth, books on agriculture were sufficiently plentiful. They are not exciting, they are not reliable but that which is written, printed and circulated, whatever its intrinsic merit, may claim attention however brief. From Fitzherbert whose *Boke of Husbandrye* saw the light in 1523 to Jethro Tull who wrote *Horse-Hoeing Husbandry* in 1731 the reader's track is over difficult country. Men who had nothing to say, authors whose authorship consisted in plundering or re-copying earlier writers, pretenders whose attitude towards the land may have given useful hints to vendors of patent medicines, purposeful men who were ill-informed, painstaking cultivators who felt that if they could farm successfully they became authors by first intention, all these litter the passing years. Of the most of them be it said that they "to no such aureate earth are turned as buried once men want dug up again." There were a few interesting figures; Arthur Young would be notable had he written earlier, but we are told "he did not commence author till 1760."

Mr. G. E. Fussell* has brought indomitable perseverance to *The Old English Farming Books* but it is not easy to say that he offers much more. Perhaps the material to be handled is too dull, perhaps the conclusions of men of past generations are outworn—"their ploughs are rust, their bones are dust, their souls are with the Saints we trust."

Happily Mr. Fussell has included in his volume more than a dozen plates, chiefly title pages and frontispieces, which are of enduring interest for they have a story to tell without the aid of more than the few words they carry.

Take for example Markham's *Way to get Wealth* published in 1638 and setting out "the knowledge use and laudable practise of all the recreations meete for a gentleman," together with "the office of a housewife, in physicke, Surgery, extraction of oils, Banquets, Cookerie, ordering of Feasts, preserving of Wine, conceited secrets, Distillations, —and the profits of Oates. The last of six books gathered by Masters for the benefit of Great Britaine." Such an appeal is quite illuminating, it has the quality of a plea for attention. Markham stole freely and wrote indifferently.

Twenty-six years later in 1664 we find the first English book on potatoes and the grandiloquent title page is preserved, to our great content. It reads: "England's Happiness Increased, or A Sure and Easie Remedy against all succeeding Dear Years by a plantation of the roots called Potatoes." "By the planting of these Roots," we learn, "ten thousand men in England and Wales who know not how to live or what to do to get a maintenance for their families, may of one acre of ground make thirty pounds per Annum." It is a pity that nothing is recorded here of cultivation or costs.

We have a plate showing John Worlidge's masterpiece, a seed drill. This farmer-author published a *Systema Agriculturae or the mystery of husbandry discovered!* His design was not used until half a century later when it was found unworkable; but the

* *The Old English Farming Books: From Fitzherbert to Tull*, by G. E. Fussell. Crosby Lockwood. 12s. 6d.

model illustrated in his *Systema* and reproduced here is imposing.

Moses Rusden, Bee Master to the Merry Monarch and author of *A further Discovery of Bees* is dismissed in half a paragraph, but some atonement is made by the aid of a plate showing an eighteenth century hive surmounted by the Crown and Arms of England; perhaps such a decoration was expected to stimulate honey-flow. Another interesting title page shows the first English work on clover. The title reads *The wonderful advantage by and right management of Clover*; it was written by Andrew Farranton of Worcestershire and published in 1663.

The general appeal of those old books is frankly commercial. By following instructions the reader is to make a fortune or at least contribute to one. We are reminded of the cheapjacks at the country fair, the men who sold solid gold watches jewelled "in forever o'holes" and pure silk handkerchiefs the last of a batch lately sold to the Emperor of China to the complete satisfaction of that ruler who was loud in their praise. There is something connecting these makers of books with the men who livened occasions that were the delight of an unsophisticated countryside.

It is interesting to learn a little, perhaps less than we would welcome, about the first agricultural newspaper described as "a succession of pamphlets." The title was *A Collection of letters for the Improvement of Husbandry and Trade*, and first saw the light in 1681. John Houghton, F.R.S., who was responsible for the publication was a prosperous business man and obviously of a kindly and honest disposition for when he admitted advertisements to his Journal he graced them with a preface of which brief sentences may be quoted: "This part is to give away and those who like it not may omit the reading of it. I believe it will help on Trade, particularly encourage the advertisers to increase the vent of my papers. I shall receive all sorts of advertisements but shall answer for the reasonableness of none." Who among our newspaper proprietors would go out of their way to admit as much?

Mr. Tim Nourse lived in the opening years of the eighteenth century. He did not approve of common lands but thought they served a useful purpose yielding "a body of hardy rascals to draw upon in emergency. They are inured to hardship and make good labourers; and they make good soldiers, fit to kill or be killed—excellent good food for powder." Nourse is the author of *Compania Foelix*; a volume graced by a pleasing frontispiece, duly reproduced.

The popularity of beekeeping in the early eighteenth century is suggested by the success of Joseph Warder's book *The True Amazons; or the Monarchy of Bees*. It gave recipes for mead and achieved eight editions.

This record of work on farming holds a measure of interest that can only be found by wading through a mass of material with which some of us would gladly dispense. Side lines give us a glimpse of rural England and of the hard conditions under which farming was carried on, but the writers were always more concerned with profit than with a way of life. As a class they claimed to have taken all knowledge to be their province; some work has been lost but, judging by what remains, regret is not called for. Tradition, rule of thumb, and a wealth of conjecture would seem to have served those whose work we have seen and Mr. Fussell may be presumed to know them better than most of his contemporaries since Lord Ernle left the world poorer by passing from it.

The book can hardly appeal to the general reader; it is too much like a catalogue with an average of more than three items to the page, but it should be of definite value to those who wish to study the general literature of our greatest national industry, or to find out what they can about an old book whether on farm, garden, orchard, or apiary that may have come into their possession.

Those who read diligently from cover to cover will not only have gained a little knowledge, they will have acquired much merit.

THE ROOSEVELT I KNEW, by Frances Perkins. *Hammond, Hammond*. 18s.

AMERICAN POLICY IN THE MAKING, 1932-1940, by Charles A. Beard. *Yale University Press*: *Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press*. 18s.

"Franklin Roosevelt was not a simple man," says Miss Perkins. "He was the most complicated human being I ever knew." As the Franklin Roosevelt literature accumulates this fact stands out in startling, undeniable relief, whatever ambiguities and controversies surround the rest of his career. Born to the American purple, he wins office as the champion of a radical political movement. The head and front of left-wing idealism, he seeks and wins support from some of the toughest, most hard-boiled machines in American politics. Gifted with a phenomenal power of popular appeal, he yet scarcely scruples to conceal the fact that the company of the average politico is socially distasteful to him. Capable of a disinterested devotion to colleagues whose retention was a political liability he was also able to reject, almost with a flick of the wrist, members of his party who had committed no other crime than that of differing from their chief on some political issue. Regarded in this country as a one-man advance-guard of American intervention, he was at the same time sprinkling his speeches in the United States with assurances which, as Professor Beard has little difficulty in showing, were couched in the very language of the isolationists. In his own lifetime he aroused extremities of love and hate; after his death the argument goes on with little abatement and no sign of resolution.

For dealing with a subject of such complexity as this Miss Perkins's book has one supreme merit. It accepts the complexity, does not try to resolve it, is content even with something less than a full explanation of it, and seeks in the first place simply and honestly to present it. The result is that probably for the first time

the English reading public has before it a picture of Roosevelt in the round, not idealized, not harnessed to some thesis or cause, but described as he was seen over a good many years by someone who was pretty close to him in good times and in bad. It is, of course, a sympathetic portrait; Miss Perkins was not only a political colleague, she was a personal friend, but their intimacy was not for her grounded in a blind devotion, and she does not believe in raising to the chieftain's memory a tombstone merely of catalogued virtues. Others will have more to say about his faults and will assess differently the balance of his qualities, but it will be a matter for surprise if they unearth any shortcomings which are not recognized in some measure here.

Miss Perkins's method is not, of course, primarily analytical. Her book is a narrative of her relations with Roosevelt from their early association in the government of New York State down through the New Deal years to the war and the return from Yalta. It is thus against the background of his political activities that the President's personality emerges, and not the least interesting feature of Miss Perkins's book is the light it throws on the pressures and problems which Roosevelt had to cope with even at the moments when he seemed most master of the political scene. These pressures and problems are wonderfully absent from Professor Beard's remarkable non-judicial exercise in war guilt appraisal. Professor Beard, at eighty, is rightly loaded with distinction as perhaps the foremost of living American historians, but he must also bear no small blame for having steadily lent the weight of his reputation to the great illusion of the 'twenties and 'thirties that the United States had a perfect freedom of choice as to whether it should become involved in war or not. Now, by an assiduous compilation of quotations, he seeks to show that Roosevelt deceived the American people as to his intentions and was responsible for their eventual involvement in war. The thesis and the treatment are alike un-

worthy of the author's pen. They do, however, pose a question of deeper significance for America and for democracies everywhere; how far can a people be made to see the truth, and what should its leaders do when it prefers to look away? Roosevelt had at least a pragmatic answer; Charles Beard has none.

H. G. NICHOLAS.

ECONOMICS FOR THE EXASPERATED, by Gordon Rattray Taylor. *John Lane, The Bodley Head.* 10s. 6d.

ASPECTS OF BRITISH ECONOMIC HISTORY 1918-1925, by A. C. Pigou. *Macmillan.* 15s.

Mr. Taylor has written a very intelligent book. Taking unemployment as a starting point, he proceeds to discuss the main problems of present-day economics in language accessible to the ordinary reader. His approach owes a great deal to the under-consumption and over-saving theory associated with the Keynes-Beveridge school of economic thought. At the same time, it makes effective use of Mr. Colin Clark's investigations into the output, national income and income distribution of the main industrial countries. Perhaps the greatest merit of Mr. Taylor's book is that it explains our contemporary economics in terms of goods, as opposed to terms of money. The author is one of those economists, not too numerous even now, who recognize that monetary phenomena are no more than a "reflection in the mirror"—and a distorting mirror at that—of concrete economic movements which can only be properly measured in terms of goods. The mirror here alluded to happens to be Alice's looking-glass, for Mr. Taylor uses quotations from Lewis Carroll with telling effect to preface many chapters of his book. Mr. Taylor's investigations into the curious contradictions, prejudices and misconceptions which govern the modern *homo oeconomicus* show clearly that Lewis Carroll's fantasies are at least as good a guide through

modern economics as the average textbook.

It cannot be claimed that Mr. Taylor's analysis of our irrational economic system and its defects, is altogether new. Nor are the remedies which he proposes, in order to render it somewhat less irrational. But Mr. Taylor has the gift of the unorthodox approach, and for apt aphorism, as when he writes (p. 387):

In a sane society, people consent to work in order that they may consume. In America, people must consent to consume in order that they may work. Surely, this is the final *reductio ad absurdum* of capitalism?

Good in all essentials, Mr. Taylor's book could have been better still if he had taken care properly to read his proofs, to check historical data and to watch out for slipshod English and irritating clichés. His political and economic history of the inter-war years suffers from over-simplification. On page 273 (note at foot of graph), the printer made millions out of billions (American style). Negations are frequently omitted or, on the contrary, inserted, making nonsense of more than one sentence (p. 194, line 15, the word 'unemployment' is used instead of 'employment'). There are even occasional errors of reasoning, as when the author sustains (p. 325) that the devaluation of the dollar in 1933 handicapped American export industries. For obvious reasons, the contrary was the case. On page 339, Monsieur Paul Reynaud is made minister of finance in Monsieur Blum's second cabinet. Unfortunately for that government, he never served in it.

Professor Pigou's book is a *pièce de circonstance* which, despite some interesting features, is unlikely to rank as one of his major works. Written at the request of government departments for their guidance in the post-war period, it attests the foresight of the authorities in preparing for a then still distant future and their determination to avoid mistakes in economic policy such as were committed after the 1914-1918 war. But Professor Pigou's volume, despite its lucidity,

is the product of the academic mind writing for other academic minds. One wonders what its effects could have been on those for whom it was intended, particularly as the author is over-cautious in his judgment on past errors. To judge from a passage on page 197, he even seems to question whether Britain's decision to restore the Pound to its pre-war value by April 1925, was a mistake. Even on the abandonment of industrial controls, he goes no further than to say that

With a less impetuous abandonment of them, the Government would have had the power—though not necessarily the will—to enforce some evening-out of the industrial activity during the three years that followed the armistice, and so might have rendered the distresses of the great post-war depression less serious than they were (p. 126).

Qu'en termes galants ces choses sont dites . . . In 1947, the greatest value of the book lies in the thirty-six pages of its statistical appendix which contains much material not to be found elsewhere.

R. P. SCHWARZ.

THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM OF THE DANUBIAN STATES:

A study in Economic Nationalism, by Frederick Hertz. *Victor Gollancz*. 15s.

It is always difficult to review a book which consists mainly of statistics. To doubt its conclusions or even to praise it conscientiously would require as much research work as the author's.

The latest book of the author of *Race and Civilization* has a definite purpose. It is to prove from the history of the hacking up of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy the follies of economic nationalism. More broadly stated, the book's aim is to investigate certain powerful economic tendencies of our time in the light of the experience of the Danubian area after the 1914-1918 war.

Professor Hertz maintains that after a steep rise in national income and in spite of a variety of circumstances favouring the continuation of this improvement, the breaking up of the Empire's area into

competing, sovereign States led to a decline of their respective national incomes. It is significant that the author's conclusions contradict Mr. Colin Clark's findings in *The Conditions of Economic Progress*. Mr. Clark found that the average real income per head in the Succession States, but particularly in Hungary, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, was distinctly higher one decade after the 1914-1918 war than in 1913. Professor Hertz's investigation, with the employment of different statistical methods, reveals a very different picture.

Beside a comparative study of national income, which forms the main part of the book, the author examines in great detail the origins and methods of the restrictionist and protectionist methods which were so characteristic of the Danubian area between the two world wars. He warns that the economic difficulties of the region were not merely due to world depression but had the seeds of malaise in their own economic nationalisms. He also maintains that this economically motivated isolationism facilitated Hitler's penetration in eastern Europe and, indirectly, was one of the chief causes of the 1939-1945 war.

The latest work of Professor Hertz is copiously documented and is a scholarly thesis to prove a case. On the factual side it would be difficult to disagree with the author. Less evident are, however, the implied conclusions. That Danubian economic nationalism was a folly, is too obvious to need any documentation. Whether, under the given political circumstances, economic co-operation in the region would have been possible, is less evident. Tendencies which emerged in the Danubian area may not warrant generalizations to be applied to other regions. The implied alternative, economic universalism, is undergoing a test in our own days with no very positive achievements to its credit.

Professor Hertz's book, however, will remain a valuable contribution to the discussion on the Danubian region. Even

if the unconditional condemnation of economic nationalism may have to be modified under the very changed circumstances of our days, the material collected by Professor Hertz will be of great help to research workers who will continue to explore the problems of that fascinating region of Europe.

TIBOR MENDE.

EVENTS AND SHADOWS, by

Lord Vansittart. *Hutchinson*. 10s. 6d.

RUSSIA AND THE RUSSIANS,

by Edward Crankshaw. *Macmillan*. 9s. 6d.

Diplomatic history is being made at a pace which is without precedent and which as yet shows no sign of slackening. As a consequence, books of topical interest on international affairs now run the risk of being outmoded within six months of publication—surely unsatisfactory from the publisher's point of view and a very inadequate reward to the author for long hours of hard work.

The Marshall offer and subsequent developments in Europe have transformed the situation which Lord Vansittart reviews in his latest book, so that much that was shadow at the time of writing has since assumed substantial form in the world of events. If this transformation had not been in line with the general trend of international affairs as seen by the author the book would be already out of date. Since, however, the immediate aim of his "Policy for the remnants of a century" is a greater degree of Western co-operation, his views are still of interest.

Unfortunately his writing abounds in blithe remarks and pert phrases which might well enliven an after-dinner speech but which in print appear moribund. Moreover this striving after effect has over-simplified some of the major political problems which any discussion of closer European integration must involve. All this may be done consciously, of course, for the author considers that 'selective history' may serve a useful pur-

pose: but it will come as a disappointment to the serious student of international affairs, who knows what a fund of wisdom is concealed behind the superficial façade of catchwords and clichés.

The greatest of all contemporary problems in the international sphere, and one which is too often over-simplified, is that of Russia and the Russians. Let it be said outright that Mr. Crankshaw tackles it with a competence and impartiality which deserve unstinted praise. In 250 pages he paints a picture of the Russian scene which is just what the perplexed British public needs and which is at the same time easy to understand and enjoy. The subject is too vast for so small a canvas, but by allowing himself the licence which is due to an artist Mr. Crankshaw presents an interpretation of it which is satisfying both in perspective and colouring. It is this interpretation, this hypothesis induced from a wide field of fact, which distinguishes his book from many others which have attempted to survey the background to Russian politics.

The author's approach is practical and to the point. He wants increased understanding of Soviet policy—and understanding is here by no means synonymous with weakness or appeasement—which can only be achieved by fuller appreciation of the historical and philosophical roots from which it springs. He argues that Russia cannot be understood from a purely intellectual standpoint. Both peasant and politician in Russia are emotional characters, with whom feeling and sentiment weigh heavier than argument; in order to judge them fairly an act of faith is required, a self-denying ordinance on the part of the intellect in favour of the emotions.

Mr. Crankshaw tries to get to know the Russian temperament emotionally, but the final weighing-up is left, as it should be, to the intellect. The weaknesses of the Soviet position are not camouflaged and the harshness, rigidity, cruelty and inhumanity of the Soviet

political system are fully depicted: so fully that an isolated assertion to the effect that "the basic cleavage between Russia and, at any rate, Great Britain, is one of temperament rather than one of principle" strikes an unmistakably discordant note. For one of the virtues of *Russia and the Russians* is that it demonstrates clearly how fundamentally the two peoples differ not only by temperament and by tradition, but equally in their political principles and their moral standards. There is no more important lesson for the British public to learn to-day, if an unbiassed appreciation of Soviet policy is to be achieved.

NIGEL BRUCE.

**LORD COCHRANE: SEAMAN—
RADICAL—LIBERATOR,** by
Christopher Lloyd. Longmans. 15s.

Lord Cochrane's biographer would have had an easier task had his subject been content with a single career, or even with one career at a time. In point of fact he had three or four different reputations and the energy to support them all. The author of this latest biography has wisely compressed the story of the *Speedy* and the *Aix Roads* into six chapters, leaving room to deal with Cochrane's political career and his adventures under foreign flags. In the ranks of the Radicals Cochrane was an incongruous figure. His interest had been initially in naval reform, coloured by a personal dislike of Lord St. Vincent, and thence it spread to the general Radical programme. Gifted with little or no political sense, he was bound to fall victim, sooner or later, to the exasperated government of the day. But the Stock Exchange Trial of 1814 gave his opponents an exceptional opening. The evidence did no more perhaps than to prove his association with the swindlers, but it gave excuse for Lord Ellenborough's savage sentence, promptly followed by the removal of Cochrane's name from the Navy List. At the time

of his imprisonment it seemed as if his career was at an end. What no one could have predicted was that the year 1848 (a year indeed of Revolutions) would find him an Admiral, a G.C.B., and the Commander-in-Chief on the American Station.

The story of how his sentence came to be reversed is a curious one. The fact that he had in the meanwhile secured the independence of Chile, Peru and Brazil was more or less irrelevant. With the Tories in office it would have told, if anything, against him. What had happened was that the reforms for which he had agitated in 1807 had become in time respectable. His friends had come into power. As for his political enemies, he could never have defeated them. But he could outlive them; and he did. The crowning touch to his career came during the Crimean War when the command of the Baltic Fleet was denied him, not because he was too old at seventy-nine but because "there is reason to apprehend that he might deeply commit the force under his command to some desperate enterprise." It is sad to think that he should have died at eighty-five before his judgment had fully ripened. "What a tribute," writes Mr. Lloyd, "to Dundonald's vitality!"

Readers of the author's other books will not be disappointed in this. Mr. Lloyd writes ably and persuasively, sure of his facts and yet easy in his style. If the Royal Naval College, Dartmouth, is to disappear as we have known it, its final broadsides are worthy of the distinguished men who have taught there and of the great officers it has bred.

C. NORTHCOTE PARKINSON.

THE BRITISH GENERAL ELECTION OF 1945, by R. B. McCallum and Alison Readman. *Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press.* 18s.

The next social study of a single general election could be better than Mr. McCallum's and Miss Readman's work. But theirs is a prototype. It gives us for

the first time a good, documented academic study of this political and sociological phenomenon.

The authors have limited themselves to recording and analysing material selected from the principal newspapers, from party literature and propaganda, in surveying qualifications of candidates and examining statistics. Their aim has been to give a reasonably clear and balanced picture of the events, issues and personalities of the 1945 election period, from the break-up of the Coalition to the evening of Thursday, July 26, when Mr. Churchill tendered his resignation.

If this book fails to portray the political emotional atmosphere of the time, the weakness is inherent in any conventionally produced textbook.

Mr. McCallum and Miss Readman have produced a shrewd, readable interpretation with touches of humour even among the statistics:

The Conservatives provided the only example of that admirable but unpopular class, the company sergeant major, who presumed to present himself to the electors. He was not elected.

The authors stress that election addresses—averaging 1,000 words in 1945—are the most fleeting of political documents. Surprisingly, none of the main political parties acquired a full collection from its candidates. (The Conservative Central Office was best, with addresses from three-quarters of its candidates.)

Expressive of candidates' personal views, these election addresses provide an intriguing chapter of the book. ("On the whole, the party line is followed loyally enough, but there are often significant omissions and variations.") The authors analyse the differences in choice and treatment of topics among the rival candidates.

Practically, too, they appreciate that the influence of the election addresses must remain a mystery, "They serve, if nothing else, as a reminder" to electors.

It is unfortunate that the chapter on the Press is devoted only to the daily Press, with inevitable emphasis on nation-

al daily newspapers. The authors consequently overlook in their survey of the 1945 election the influence of Britain's fourteen hundred local newspapers.

These local newspapers were able to portray candidates in detail as national papers could not do. In these days of public inquiry into Press activities, an authenticated survey of the attitude of such newspapers during the general election would have made a good test case for discussion. As things are, frequent public allegations on the political bias of the Press are based—as in this chapter—on study of only our widely circulating national newspapers.

The book is well-indexed and has four useful appendices of tables and analyses relating to the election results. One appendix designed in part to show the possibilities of statistical analysis, challenges "the only serious statistical attempt to account for the general election result" (that published by Mr. Mark Abrams in *Pilot Papers* January 1, 1946).

Though there is still truth in the allegation, "there are lies, damned lies, and statistics", political forecasters who study this textbook can hardly go more wrong than they have been (usually, excepting of course, Dr. Gallup). They will be poor readers of this book if they still base their forecasts for the next general election on "straw votes", general impressions, and wishful thinking.

JAMES BARTLETT.

MEDIAEVAL CHANTRIES AND CHANTRY CHAPELS, by G. H. Cook. *Phoenix House*. 21s.

The Middle Ages are not to be understood by looking at surviving medieval buildings, however carefully. Monastic as well as parochial buildings have indeed received full treatment. It is widely recognized that when the lesser and then the greater monasteries were suppressed a phase was ended not alone of the religious and architectural but of the social life of England. But that is not the whole story. For two centuries before

the Reformation, with increasing intensity, a movement had been spreading for the endowment of chantries and chantry chapels. An Act of Edward VI dissolved the chantries, the Elizabethan Prayer Book declared the doctrine of Purgatory to be "a fond thing vainly imagined," and all over the country chantry chapels were destroyed or dismantled and the chantry priests dismissed.

The subsequent employment of many chantry priests as teachers in the new grammar-schools has been illustrated from the records of Dunstable Priory. They had often combined such masterships with the duties of their chantries before the suppressions. The chantry chapel itself disappeared, along with the doctrine which sanctioned or required the performance of daily masses for the dead. The result is reflected in one way or another in nearly every pre-Reformation church, big or little. Thus the unusual size of some parish churches in small places, as well as their bareness, is explained by the fact that aisles, transepts and choir were filled, and often constructed to be filled, with chantry chapels. These were often retained as family burying places by the squire of the place—they might even become roomy squire's pews, still surviving here and there from the age of Sir Roger de Coverley, complete with fireplace. Here is the contrast of religious practices in its extreme form. For the chantry chapel owed its original to a strong and almost universal religious impulse. The founder of a chantry provided for daily prayers in permanence, in the most solemn rite of the Church, for his own soul and those of others, living and dead. His tomb was to be a shrine also. He surrounded it—frequently in his own lifetime—with symbols of mortality and immortality. The architectural expression of his faith, where it has not been disturbed, remains in exquisite form and colour.

This book is the first wholly devoted to the subject, and that is seen to be no offshoot but a part of the main story of

English ecclesiastical architecture, interpreted with reference to its doctrinal background. In spite of destruction, first under Edward VI, later, as at Peterborough, by the Cromwellian soldiery, later still by unhappy restoration, the author is able to reveal and describe, with the aid of full-page plates and plans of the sites occupied by chantry chapels, a surprising number of surviving masterpieces great and small. Westminster Abbey provides the opposites in Henry VII's chapel and the tomb of Chaucer—which is a chantry chapel with room for the priest to kneel beside the altar. But who knows for example of the Guildhall Chapel chantries (destroyed in 1822) or of the Kirkham Chapel, still almost intact, in Paignton Church? We may learn the real purpose of the "squint", so often misapprehended; it was to enable the chantry priest to make his own celebration coincide with that at the high altar.

HEFFER'S of Cambridge BOOKS

ON ALL SUBJECTS

ENGLISH & FOREIGN
NEW & SECONDHAND

Buyers of:

*FINE, RARE &
SCHOLARLY BOOKS*

W. HEFFER &
SONS LTD.,

Petty Cury-Cambridge



Much curious lore will be found in these pages, which are fully documented from wills and royal ordinances, as in that of Henry VII for his *obit* at Bermondsey Abbey. The *obit* was a mass sung on the anniversary of a man's death and its endowment was less costly than that of a chantry. Henry ordered among other ceremonies the singing of *Placebos* and *Diriges*. The *Placebo* was Psalm cxvi: "I will please the Lord in the land of the living" and *Dirige* is for *Domine dirige nos*: "Direct us, O Lord, in all our doings"—Psalm v and the motto of the City of London. A stimulating and careful work, offering a contribution to knowledge in a field almost neglected hitherto.

W. THOMSON HILL.

SEVEN ESSAYS, by George Sampson. *Cambridge University Press.* 10s. 6d.

Among contemporary literary forms the English essay holds a commendably high place. Sir Max Beerbohm, Mr. J. B. Priestley, Mr. Robert Lynd and Mr. E. M. Forster all excel in honouring what had become the Cinderella of literature and now here is Mr. George Sampson, sanest and most forthright of critics, with a book that cannot fail to delight readers who are fully adult with his mature and witty reflections on life, music, education and letters. There is too in this collection a masterly appreciation of Henry Irving which will find its way into any representative anthology of English essays.

As Mr. Sampson says, a writer whose first volume was published in 1897, who has made numerous contributions to periodicals, daily, weekly, monthly, quarterly, annual, and who waits fifty years before issuing a collection of miscellanies, can hardly be called a young man in a hurry. Indeed he is not but there is a youthful zest and pugnacity in some of his judgments that reminded me of another apparently eternal youth, Mr. Sampson's pet

antipathy, Bernard Shaw. Only one does not find in this book any of the will to shock for the sake of shocking that makes some of the sprightly nonagenarian's opinions resemble the snook-cocking and tongue-protruding of a preparatory schoolboy.

Two great enthusiasms have informed Mr. Sampson's life—literature and music. It is not surprising, therefore, to find him, after a characteristic warning—"Comparisons between one form of art and another are generally unprofitable and often mischievous"—devoting twenty-four pages to "Bach and Shakespeare". It is impossible not to quote a part of his conclusions: "Bach, like Shakespeare, is for all time and for all men. He is a universal genius, the last of the medieval composers and the first of the moderns. Just as no poet can write without some influence from Shakespeare, so no musician can be left untouched by Bach. The best of Bach, like the best of Shakespeare, has an idiom that transcends its own age, and becomes the speech of every age. They are the greatest masters of rhythmic utterance we know, and the magic with which they set rhythm against metre they might have learned from each other. In their moments of simplicity as well as in their flights of complicated beauty they can achieve in triumph effects too audacious for lesser men. It is almost amusing to recall that both have been denounced for their incorrectness and indifference to rules. There is in both a largeness and breadth of understanding, a sense of human joys as well as of human tears.

The longest essay in the book, "A Boy and His Books", which would stand any comparison with a famous piece by Hazlitt, gives rise to the hope that Mr. Sampson will embark upon a more protracted autobiographical study. It is a remarkable description of happy Victorian youth and should be read by all the dreary young things who look back with horror and loathing at an era known to them imperfectly, and understood not at all. "Truth and Beauty" reveals a fact too little comprehended to-day, that we are

so busy teaching that we give our pupils no chance to learn, and that we anticipate curiosity, and begin at once to answer the questions that no one has begun to ask, and somewhere at the back of our minds is the thought of a coming examination.

I have not read for a very long time a book more stimulating or more beautifully phrased on literature, music, and education than Mr. Sampson's *Seven Essays* and that is not surprising when one considers that only he could have written it and that in his seventy-odd years he has published so little of his own. A new and prosperous career as author lies before this youthful septuagenarian.

ERIC GILLET.

THE LETTERS AND PRIVATE PAPERS OF WILLIAM MAKEPEACE THACKERAY. Edited by Gordon Ray. *Oxford University Press. Volumes III & IV. Four vols. £6 6s. the set.*

The third and fourth volumes of this work deal with the last eleven years of Thackeray's life and enable the reader to judge him by his own diaries and letters for the first time.

The third opens at the time when *Esmond* was published, the first of his novels to appear in three volumes. Thackeray was now gaining great popularity by touring the country reading his work, a form of entertainment that was popular at this period. At the end of the year we see him leaving his daughters with their grandmother and, lured by the very generous remuneration offered, going off to enhance his fame amongst his American readers.

Already at this time Thackeray's health had begun to show signs of deteriorating, and there is frequent mention of his ailments in his letters. He made them the excuse to take Eyre Crowe with him as his secretary, to relieve him of the strain of making his own travelling arrangements.

As time passes his letters, written on both visits to America, go more and more

to his daughters and amount more or less to a diary of all that he is doing and the people he is meeting. As usual he has the capacity for making many friends; the greatest in America were undoubtedly the Baxter family, to whom he wrote copiously when he returned home.

The two most striking facts in his letters when away from home are his dislike at being separated from his nearest relatives, which is a characteristic to be noted also in his early letters to his mother in India, and his constant reference to his need to carry out his lecture tours in order to ensure that adequate provision would be made for his dependants. He tells his daughters that the number of dollars accumulating to protect their future is his only justification for such long absences.

Thackeray struck up a warm friendship with his new publisher, George Smith of Smith Elder, which resulted in his

CRIME AND BANDITRY, DISTRESS AND PERPLEXITY WILL INCREASE

UNTIL THE BISHOPS OPEN
JOANNA SOUTHCOTT'S BOX

What the Bible says about the Box
and the Bishops :

"And the temple of God was opened, . . . and there was seen, . . . the Ark (Chest or Box) of his Testament (or Willy)".

"And round about the Throne were four-and-twenty . . . Elders (Bishops) sitting, . . . (and they) fall down and cast their crowns (their wisdom) before the Throne".

— *Rev. xl., 19; II., 4, 10.*

Write for free leaflets to

THE PANACEA SOCIETY,
Bedford, England

being asked to become the first editor of *The Cornhill Magazine*. As his letters show, he gathered in as contributors all the great writers of the day, amongst whom was the founder of THE FORTNIGHTLY to whom Thackeray wrote: "Dear Mr. Trollope, . . . let me come to the pleasure and say how very glad indeed I shall be to have you as co-operator in our magazine." Later in writing to Mrs. Baxter he expresses the opinion that *Cornhill* readers like Trollope's writing better than his own. *The Cornhill* was a great success under Thackeray, but he felt his strength unable to bear the dual strain of writing and editing a monthly magazine and resigned quickly.

His later letters are written from 2 Palace Green, a house he built to his own design. The last part of the fourth volume is devoted to his undated and undateable letters. Thackeray frequently illustrated points in his letters by means of the most delightful sketches, and these are reproduced where they occur.

Dr. Ray has added copious notes and appendices, which are very helpful to the reader. He also promises a further volume of letters, derived mostly from collections in this country, which the war prevented his including in their correct rotation. It will be interesting to see what further gaps in Thackeray's life are filled thereby.

The letters give a most enlightening description of the life, first of a struggling journalist and then of a great man of letters, who made his name famous on both sides of the Atlantic. His grandchildren are to be congratulated on allowing this vast correspondence to be shared by the rest of the world.

J. A. WALEY COHEN.

GAMES FOR COURT AND GARDEN, by Gordon Winter. *Pilot Press*. 6s. 6d.

Apart from lawn tennis, which has now an almost universal appeal, most of the games here described are played by

only a small number of enthusiasts. Yet squash rackets, fives and badminton all provide good exercise in any weather conditions and have all that is best about games to commend them. It is good to have the information about them, together with the less violent sports of archery and croquet, so conveniently collected together with a foreword by Lord Aberdare. If the book inspires the hesitant to venture upon something hitherto untried it will achieve its purpose. The author has wisely added chapters on less formal games (such as rounders and quoit tennis) from which much additional joy of life can be obtained.

Lord Grey of Fallodon once said that he could never even watch from a train window a small boy trying to catch a fish with a bent pin and a piece of string without envying him. It is something of this spirit that is needed if more of the vast crowds who watch games can be shown how great also is the pleasure to be gained from playing them. Such is the emphasis of this little book, which is simple and sensible, and, moreover, soundly illustrated with good photographs.

J.F.B.

BEFORE THE ROMANTICS: AN ANTHOLOGY OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT, chosen by Geoffrey Grigson. *Routledge*. 10s. 6d.

ENGLISH SONNETS, edited with an Introduction by Walt Taylor. *Longmans*. 8s. 6d.

The title of Mr. Grigson's new book suggests that it deals with anticipations of the Romantic Movement, the glimmer before the dawn, the first twitches of the Picturesque and the Gothic of which the later developments were so excitingly displayed by the same editor in *The Romantics*. This impression is corrected by the sub-title, for here is an anthology of the Enlightenment, of the poetry and prose of form, reason and common sense.

Among the many misleading differentiations between the Classical and the

Romantic is that which equates the first with reason and the second with imagination, or even with the irrational. Yet to me, the eighteenth century is at its most romantic precisely in its cult of reason. The introvert mind of the poet may rot and ruminate over tombs and rocks and storms, but for the majority of ordinary men for two hundred years the romantic dream has been one bright gigantic bubble of optimism, expanding at the rate of the universe until the atom bomb burst it. Its popular prophets in the eighteenth century were Defoe and Robert Paltock, in the twentieth century, Wells; it enveloped Wordsworth and Shelley as well as Stephenson (George) and Edison, Godwin as well as Livingstone. There is much of such optimism and curiosity in the first section of this book. John Ray and Thomas Burnet, for instance, ridiculing the idea that the universe was created for Man, and John Tillotson ridiculing the idea that it wasn't—"Would the mole have admired the fine gold?". Burnet and Ray are known to many of us mainly through Basil Willey's *The Eighteenth Century Background* (a book which seems to lie behind this collection), and here we will find admirable quotations juxtaposed with skill and wit. The second section is the corrective. Mr. Grigson can prescribe Swift both for the neo-romantics and the neo-classicists:

Or oft when Epithets you link,
In gapping Lines to fill a chink,
Like stepping stones to save a Stride,
In Streets where Kennels are too wide:
Or like a Heelpiece to support
A Cripple with one Foot too short.

In the third section we return with affection and with slacker collars to Smart's flowers, Shenstone's grove and the Dusky Region of the Soul. This book does not give a complete picture of its time, of course; it is selective and personal, but like all Mr. Grigson's anthologies it gives a greater proportion than do most of work which is good to read and which otherwise might never have been discovered by the average reader. And that surely, is what an anthology is really for.

The second book is less of a personal selection—it is a collection of English sonnets, designed to show the development and scope of the form. Mr. Taylor's choice is at times hard to understand (Hartley Coleridge, for instance, has six sonnets to Donne's three; Rupert Brooke nine to none by Auden), but on the whole you will find all the great sonneteers well represented, with solid samples from those Elizabethans who are not, perhaps, easily accessible to everyone.

The sonnet is a product of the Renaissance, and it was at the Renaissance that it flowered in full richness. Then, in spite of its fairly rigid form, it achieved great variety. On the one hand the miraculous twining loveliness of Spenser, where each sonnet opens out into the next like rock-pools and grottoes linked by a falling stream, and on the other the passion of Donne, kicking and exploding till the shape rattles. Shakespeare in himself combined the braided effect of Spenser with the wit of Donne, and beside these there was the courtliness of Sir Philip Sidney, the big-limbed resignation of Drummond of Hawthornden, and the unblunted masculinity of Drayton. With Milton, of course, "the thing became a trumpet", but after Milton the sonnet has been practised with real success only by those poets who were able to recapture something of the spirit of the Renaissance—by Keats, looking back to Spenser and Sidney, or by Hopkins, catching fire from Donne. Even Wordsworth's sonnets, noble as the best of them are, would have been better poems, I think, if they had been written in another form. The rhyme system was too stiff for him, and Milton, "living at this hour", had to drag "bower" and "dower" behind like the chains of Marley's ghost. Moreover, though the sonnet is a short form it is clear that only a few poets have enough to say to fill it, and not many of those in the latter part of this anthology are among them.

NORMAN NICHOLSON.

BOOKS ON THE TABLE

Mr. Ivor Brown's *SAY THE WORD* (*Jonathan Cape*. 6s.) sets the standard for these end-of-summer pages. His studies on living language, of which this is the fourth, incite those who care about style to vow never again to be guilty of the shopworn, the slapdash or the shoddy in speech or writing. This time he berates "puddering", defined as "the jargon of the learned or of those who pretend to rare wisdom," and translates the Lord's Prayer into Pudderese which, instead of the expected shock, gives the reader a new realization of the original's perfection. As a result of Mr. Brown's too disarming remarks about the supposed and real errors in his text, the impulse to inform him that he has deprived H. L. Mencken's name of its 'c' on page 21 proves irresistible. Those who can never have too much of this very good thing of his will be relieved to know that the publishers forbade Mr. Brown to call the present book *Having the last word*.

How to write a letter

How great a master of the written word was Mendelssohn is demonstrated by MENDELSSOHN LETTERS, edited and translated by G. Selden-Goth (*Paul Elek*. 16s.), a book which can only deepen the spell cast by his radiant personality. Whether he is the twelve-year-old telling of his meetings with Goethe, or with Thibaut six years later, or of the overwhelmingness of London and of what the Hebrides meant to him at the age of twenty, his powers of observation and of apt description never failed. His considerable gift for sketching (how sound this was may be judged by his advice on the practice of painting written a few months before his death), his zest for experience and his deep affection for his relatives, make these some of the most charming letters ever published. They attest his maturity as a

child no less than does his music. So often has he been scolded for his too facile technique, for the storms and stresses that passed his inspiration by. Lucky Mendelssohn! Had he lived through a hundred unhappy years he would never have excelled the masterpieces of his happy youth. So his is one of the few premature deaths of genius unregretted by the lovers of his music. These will find this book a treasure; the reproduction of the jottings Mendelssohn made in music (all 'hummable'), of his drawings and water-colours, of the portraits of him from childhood to his last sleep, the whole lavish and loving format, call for longer treatment than it can receive here.—Fanny Kemble was playing in a Leeds theatre when she heard of Mendelssohn's death in 1847. She was another "born letter-writer", whose correspondence has been collected by Henry Gibbs in *YOURS AFFECTIONATELY, FANNY* (*Jarrolds*. 18s.). One could wish that the method in the former book, whereby editorial comments are confined to the beginning of each period of the subject's life, had been used here. The actress's views, not only on plays, actors, acting and playwrights but on current affairs, like railway accidents at home and slavery in America, are always so shrewd and lively that Mr. Gibbs's diligent interpolations grow into rather wearisome interruptions. This volume, too, is exceedingly well illustrated and study of the nineteenth century playbills is particularly rewarding.

Film heyday

Memories that could only belong to the twentieth century are evoked by C. A. Lejeune's *CHESTNUTS IN HER LAP* (*Phoenix House*. 10s. 6d.). This is a collection of her *Observer* film criticisms from 1936 to 1946 and, once past the irrelevancy of her pride in her son and his in her, it will be seen that they easily

stand up to the test of reprinting. Her intelligence, her turn of phrase, her wit, and, above all, her unquenchable enthusiasm for the cinema make these stimulating essays on the implications of the films, good or bad, of which they treat.

Full lives

And now into the daylight with John Stewart Collis whose *DOWN TO EARTH (Jonathan Cape. 9s. 6d.)* is so much more than the story of an agricultural labourer and a forester with a taste for writing. It is rather the recording of the thought and feeling of an 'intellectual' (dire word) who has turned his back on the clutter of towns and has thereby found contentment. His reflections on the potato, the ant, the cloud, or the plough are reinforced by his scientific and technical knowledge but he keeps intact his sense of the poetry, the balance, in nature. As trees are to him beings to be revered, it is not surprising that he found his deepest satisfaction in the wood which he cleared and thinned. David Koster's wood engravings do more than illustrate Mr. Collis's themes; they have the feeling of his philosophy.—

J. R. P. Postlethwaite, too, sees that life is good. *I LOOK BACK (T. V. Boardman. 9s. 6d.)* is the autobiography of a man who was born in China, went to school at Haileybury, knew what it was to feel like the office boy in a London business house, became a Provincial Commissioner in Africa and, after retirement, served in the Ministry of Food and with UNRRA. The recounting of such a busy, interesting life calls perhaps for the touch of complacency and excuses a lack of what Mr. Ivor Brown would call "the flowers of speech."

Haworth Parsonage

These belonged as if by birthright to the Brontë sisters. Royston Millmore celebrates the centenary of the publication of the novels with *BRIEF LIFE OF THE BRONTES (W. R. Millmore, 11 Heights Lane, Bradford. 5s.)*. In spite of the headings scattered throughout its

pages, giving it the appearance of an old-fashioned textbook, this is an entirely readable, complete little biography to supplement Mrs. Gaskell's study and to correct some cherished fallacies. To those who are permanently fascinated by the contemplation of Charlotte, Emily and Anne, any further gleanings are welcome, and these and the more familiar details are imparted with a terseness which does not disguise the author's belief that the Brontës were "the most remarkable family in the history of literature."

"untimely death"

A penetrating assessment of Charlotte Brontë and her work is to be found in *DEMETRIOS CAPETANAKIS (John Lehmann. 10s. 6d.)*. By the death of Capetanakis in 1944 at the age of thirty-two the world lost a poet and a philosopher it could ill spare. He came from Greece in 1939 and lived here to the end, learning to write with ease in the foreign tongue. Some of his friends have combined to make this book a just tribute to his gifts and personality: John Lehmann contributes the Introduction, Edith Sitwell discusses the poetry of Capetanakis, and Panayotis Canellopoulos and William Plomer write of their intimate contacts with him. His poems are included, together with a group of essays on Rimbaud, Proust, Dostoevsky, Thomas Gray and Horace Walpole among others, and the whole portrays as Miss Sitwell says, "the high and noble spirit of a Greek hero."

Russian writing

The opportunity to amplify the scanty knowledge of Russian writers, which is all that most Britishers possess, comes with the publication of two books: *SOVIET LITERATURE TO-DAY* by George Reavey (*Lindsay Drummond. 8s. 6d.*) and *JANKO LAVRIN'S PUSHKIN AND RUSSIAN LITERATURE (English Universities Press. 5s.)*. The first is a sympathetic analysis of what Mr. Reavey describes as "the trend of Soviet literature over the last decade . . . as it reflects the march of

Soviet life." Such chapters as "The Principle of Soviet Realism", "Anniversaries, Deaths and Funerals" and "The Idea of the Hero in Soviet Fiction" confirm that the book is more than a "narrow literary history". He has much to say about the Pushkin of the other volume and this, its author says, "is not so much a biography as an attempt to present to a foreign audience a great literary figure through his own creations and against the background of the epoch in which he lived." As Pushkin is regarded as "the most vital link between Russian and English literature", in this connection the reader would profit by reading the second book first.

Whitman whole

The understanding of Whitman as democrat and poet has too often been retarded by the habit of serving up indigestible chunks of his verse at any and every meal. It is good therefore to have all the poems in one larder, as it were, where they can be sorted on to their appropriate shelves or poured into the proper receptacles. Everyman Library (*Dent*, 4s.) has issued a new edition of *LEAVES OF GRASS* with comprehensive notes and an introduction by Emory Holloway of Queens College, New York City. Shed of the sociological and political moralizings that have clung about it in a thick legend, his purpose stands out clear and simple when he says:

Of Life immense in passion, pulse and power,
Cheerful, for freest action form'd under the
laws divine,

The Modern Man I sing.

Nevertheless, reading him again at length corroborates a youthful impression that he wrote great, gusty dollops of prose cut to look like verse.

The book of the play

The only novel on the table is *THE CABBAGE PATCH* by Noel Langley (*Arthur Barker*, 8s. 6d.). The scene is mostly Lady Buckering's house where the

rent and the butler are unpaid and the uproar is incessant; the characters: herself, her four daughters with husbands or boy friends, a maternity nurse, and the family doctor. If the author is not the Noel Langley writ large in the credit titles of a recent 'film offering' it would still be surprising if he concocted this book without the cinema in mind. This reader, however, sees it so much as a theatre piece, one of those enjoyable comedies of family life which run interminably, that the absence of stage directions as the tale progressed was positive irritation. Moreover, types are so identifiable that even the cast could be assembled. Once he stops straining after far-fetched symbols Mr. Langley's bear-garden becomes very good fun.

R.A.F. vignettes

There is fun of a more desperate sort in *THE SURVIVORS* by John Sommerfield (*John Lehmann*, 8s. 6d.), who might well be counted among the more outstanding chroniclers of the R.A.F. with this collection of stories. They seem to have been written while he was on active service overseas, particularly in the desert, and his people are real enough as individuals to indicate that there is possibly a large slice of autobiography in his pages. Phil, for instance, in the tale that gives the book its name is quite recognizable, behind his pilot's uniform, as the young man he was before the war. This ability to keep personalities separate in situations of collective danger and death is always a feat. The dialogue, too, seems to be utterly convincing, as in "Nobody got roasted", and the scene is lit no less by Mr. Sommerfield's prose than by the burning aircraft itself. What he will make of civilian material remains to be seen but after this book it looks as if he could not fail.

GRACE BANYARD.